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As the Japanese economy continues to experience negative or near-zero
growth under weak demand, many economists and policy makers are in-
creasingly concerned over the accuracy of many key economic statistics. In
particular, the accuracy of the consumer price index (CPI) has become a
central issue.
The annual CPI registered declines in 1998 through 2001. In early 2002,
the data indicate the possibility that deﬂation might be somewhat acceler-
ating. While the economy seems to be ﬂoating at the edge of a deﬂationary
spiral, many suspect and are worried that prices are falling faster than CPI
statistics suggest. Supporting these concerns are such things as Seiyu, a
large supermarket chain, publishing an index showing how its own prices
had fallen much faster than the oﬃcial CPI.
If CPI data contain signiﬁcant measurement errors, such that the down-
ward trend is not measured with accuracy, the cost of such bias can be sub-
stantial. Consider, for example, potential ramiﬁcations on the heated de-
bate over monetary policy, especially inﬂation targeting. The very idea of
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thors are of course responsible for any errors in the paper.inﬂation targeting hinges critically on timely and accurate measurement of
the inﬂation rate. Because retail price data collected by So ¯musho (Ministry
of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs, Posts, and Telecommunications)
for the CPI are also used for the national income statistics, mismeasure-
ments in the CPI can lead to serious errors in gross domestic product
(GDP) statistics as well.
In general, the potential cost of incorrect or absent measurements in
oﬃcial statistics can be substantial and are not limited to aﬀecting policy
making. Many economists in the ﬁnancial sector and consulting ﬁrms have
voiced concern over the noise and inconsistency in the quarterly GDP es-
timates. The discrepancy between preliminary and ﬁnal GDP ﬁgures is
suspected to originate in the inconsistency in several dimensions of the
methodologies employed in the two estimates.1
Given the critical role of key economic indicators such as GDP and CPI,
it is not surprising that large and frequent swings in oﬃcial statistics can
create visible commotions in ﬁnancial markets and other sectors of the
economy. The potential costs due to problems in the oﬃcial statistics are
widespread and far reaching. For example, a key part of the structural re-
form advanced by the Koizumi government is job creation in services and
information technologies (IT). However, there are no oﬃcial statistics to
guide such policy, as none of the published data report job creation by
start-ups or job destruction from closing of establishments.
To be fair, there are many good, even wonderful, things to say about eco-
nomic statistics in Japan. There is extensive and comprehensive coverage
on a wide spectrum of topics, especially those collected on an establish-
ment basis. Some are quite exotic and probably not available anywhere
elsein the world; many are collected by nongovernment institutions. More-
over, data are comprehensive, geographically and otherwise. Although the
country consists of many small islands, most government statistics cover
virtually the entire population.
There are problems, of course, some rather serious in nature and quan-
titatively important. In this paper, we point out several underlying factors
responsible for the problems in oﬃcial statistics in Japan. In doing this,
however, the focus is on the CPI. Most of the problems raised by the Boskin
Commission for the U.S. CPI are found in Japan’s CPI. In many areas, the
potential ramiﬁcations seem even more important in Japan.
The CPI is an important and popular statistic and is used for many
diﬀerent purposes. The CPI inﬂation rate is one of the key indicators for
cyclical ﬂuctuations of the economy. The CPI also is used as the bench-
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1. For example, in the preliminary GDP ﬁgures, private ﬁxed investment growth for the year
2000 initially was reported as 4.6 percent, this became 9.3 percent in the ﬁnal ﬁgure. For a brief
review of the quality-of-statistics issue and a response by the Economic and Social Research
Institute, Cabinet Oﬃce, see the website http://www5.cao.go.jp/2000/g/0602g-gdpcoments.
html.mark in many wage-setting negotiations and public pensions are linked to
it. (Although, for political reasons, the pensions have not been adjusted
downward to reﬂect the sizable decline in the CPI.) Recent macroeconomic
developments in Japan also add to the signiﬁcance of studying potential
mismeasurements in CPI in that the stagnant economy has been experi-
encing zero or negative inﬂation rates for prolonged periods, an experience
that is rather unique and which might shed new light on issues of measure-
ment biases in CPI.
The choice of the CPI is partly because of the authors’ background: In
past research we have used disaggregated price data as well as price indices
such as CPI or wholesale price index (WPI) and therefore we are concerned
about their accuracy. More important is the depth of the analysis that can
be achieved. Although GDP is by far the most popular and important sta-
tistic, it is a secondary one based on a large variety of primary statistics.
That means the potential sources of biases and other problems are simply
too great to be thoroughly analyzed in a single paper.2
Moreover, the CPI shares with other major oﬃcial statistics the under-
lying causes of the problems in the Japanese oﬃcial statistics system. We
hope this investigation of the CPI helps elucidate the nature of the prob-
lems commonly found in many important oﬃcial economic statistics of
Japan.
The paper is organized as follows: First we oﬀer an overview of oﬃcial
statistics in Japan, point out several important deﬁciencies, and then re-
view key issues in the CPI. Using this background, we investigate potential
problems in several major aspects of the CPI. These include data collection
procedures (including how discounted prices are handled), services, qual-
ity change and new products, and aggregation issues (substitution across
time, brands, and stores). We then look at a discrepancy between CPI and
WPI that probably relates to diﬀerences in how quality adjustments are
made and some hitherto neglected aspects of the measurement problem,
relating to shopping and storage behaviors. From this analysis we oﬀer a
tentative assessment of the magnitude of the CPI inﬂation rate bias and
draw some suggestions for improving the statistics in general and the CPI
in particular.
A cautionary note on the distinction between potential measurement er-
rors in general and bias in the inﬂation rate: Measurement errors contam-
inate the CPI, but they do not imply systematic bias in the measured in-
ﬂation rate, or changes in the cost-of-living index. For example, consider
medical and health care services. Although we believe there are serious
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2. For the revised System of National Account (SNA) in Japan, see the website http://
www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/020612/outline.pdf. Ando (2002) explains in great detail the prob-
lems he encountered in SNA data as he investigated the cause of the long stagnation of the
Japanese economy. For those not familiar with Japanese economic statistics, Matsuoka and
Rose (1994) provide a gateway into major economic statistics in Japan.measurement errors and under-representation problems, it is unclear if
and in which direction they aﬀect the measured inﬂation rate. Indeed, sev-
eral indices shown in Iwamoto (2000) indicate higher, and others, lower, in-
ﬂation in medical expenditure than does the CPI.
4.1 Overview of Oﬃcial Statistics
Japanese oﬃcial statistics fall into three broad groups based on how they
are created. Primary statistics collected for speciﬁc purposes (cho ¯sa-to ¯kei),
primary statistics collected as part of the regular tasks of governmental
oﬃces (gyo ¯mu-to ¯kei), and processed statistics derived from primary data.
Primary data on exports and imports (Custom Clearance Statistics) com-
piled by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is an important example of the
second group. The National Accounts are by the far the most well known
of the last group.
A more important distinction among cho ¯sa-to ¯keiis based on legal status.
The core series of oﬃcial statistics are called designated statistics (shitei-
to ¯kei). There also are approved statistics, so named because they are ap-
proved by the Minister of So ¯musho.
Designated and approved statistics have special status in the law. Specif-
ically, the law stipulates clearly that government bodies collecting these sta-
tistics are endowed with authority to request and enforce proper coopera-
tion from the public chosen to be surveyed. At the same time, the law sets
rather rigid restrictions on the use and dissemination of information so ob-
tained. This allows the data collection agency to conduct surveys and cen-
sus in a way that private bodies without such authorization cannot hope to
accomplish. In short, compared to other oﬃcial statistics, these two types
of statistics are given priority in data collection and a more stringent set of
rules governs their use and dissemination. Table 4.1lists the number of des-
ignated and approved statistics by the ministry responsible for collecting
them along with that ministry’s staﬀ and budget for statistics.
4.1.1 Staﬃng and Collecting
Oﬃcially, the Statistics Bureau of So ¯musho is responsible for coordinat-
ing the activities of the statistics sections of all ministries. It is apparent,
however, that the system is highly decentralized and each ministry seems to
act on its own in creating, collecting, abandoning, and publishing data.
Which ministry is responsible for a series often is a historical accident, but
ministries seem unwilling to reshuﬄe assignments. For example, So ¯musho
conducts the Survey of Research and Development, the National Tax
Agency collects data on salaries in the private sector, and the Bank of
Japan (technically not even a part of the government) compiles the WPI
and corporate service price index (CSPI).
Table 4.2 displays data for the U.S. federal government comparable to
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1999 Budget
Ministry Designateda Approvedb (¥ millions)c Staﬀ
Agriculture 8 119 13,032 5,979d
Education 4 50 256 102
Finance 2 8 144 86
Health and labor 8 102 5,758 465
Land and transport 7 68 4,169 124
Public management (So ¯musho) 14 59 14,494 1,617
Trade and industry 17 47 5,867 381
Others 0 27 1,360 50
Total 62 480 45,080 8,804e
Source: So ¯musho (1999, 2000b).
aWe include only those designated statistical series that are currently collected on a periodic
basis, thus excluding those for which new data collection has been stopped. In eﬀect, the lat-
ter series are no longer used, primarily because of the lack of interest (they retain the special
status only because the use of the original data is still tightly controlled by law).
bThe number of approved series collected in each year at each ministry varies widely, but the
total number has been stable between 400 and 500 since the mid-1990s. Unlike the designated
series, many of these statistics are collected once and only.
cIn ¥ millions for ﬁscal 1999, which ended 31 March 2000. This is roughly 0.06 percent of the
central government budget. The budget has been in a ¥40–50 billion range since the early
1990s, except when there is a population census (years ending in 0 and 5). Thus, the total ﬁs-
cal 2000 budget was ¥98.6 billion, with ¥75.9 billion allocated to So ¯musho, which conducts the
census.
dThis is 68 percent of the total. Most of them are at regional oﬃces of the ministry.
eThe total given is 2.2 percent of total central government administrative staﬀ, 398,000.
Table 4.2 U.S. Statistical Staﬀ and Budget
Permanent Staﬀ
2002 Budget ($ millions)a Total Statisticians
Agriculture 366.6 1,595 33
Commerce, except census 143.1 4,154 1,403
Census Bureau 563.4 3,708 1,398
Education 198.0 127 78
Health, “Homeland Security” 1,260.6 606 212
Justice 57.4 67 42
Labor 655.4 2,792 179
Transportation 122.3 162 54
Other 686.3 374 55
Total 4,110.5 9,877 2,056
Totalb 3,906.3 6,169 658
Source: U.S. Executive Oﬃce of the President, Oﬃce of Management and Budget (2002).
aEstimate for ﬁscal year ending 30 September 2003.
bExcludes the 2000 census, entities spending less than $0.5 million, and statistics collection in
conjunction with other major activities.table 4.1. Its budget in 2002 was roughly ten times that of Japan in absolute
terms and over three times in share terms. Although total staﬀ is similar,
this is only because of the large number employed at Japan’s Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery.
Composition of staﬀ in Japan is problematic. As far as is known, only a
very few workers actually have advanced degrees in statistics, and virtually
no one does in economics. Based upon information from So ¯musho, Statis-
tics Bureau, perhaps 10 (out of 384 full time staﬀ) have an M.S. in statis-
tics, and no one had an M.A. or Ph.D. in economics.3 In contrast, the U.S.
federal government employs more than 2,000 professional statisticians on
a full-time permanent basis. It is not clear, however, how many of them
have advanced degrees in statistics or economics. In any case, we are cer-
tain that U.S. government professional staﬀwith advanced degrees far out-
numbers the Japanese counterpart.
4.2 General Data Problems
Japanese statistics have several broad problems in addition to the ab-
sence of statistical professionals among the staﬀ mentioned above. These
include long lead times, coordination among agencies, appropriateness of
the data collected, access to raw data, and information on how data are
processed.
4.2.1 Long Delays in Adjustments
Titles of the designated statistics indicate that their coverage is far from
being well balanced. Although each series diﬀers in scope and size, table
4.1 is at least suggestive of the imbalance between the coverage of oﬃcial
statistics and the relative importance of subjects covered. This reﬂects
slowness in changing the data collected to reﬂect changes in the economy.
The imbalance is particularly noticeable in agriculture and ﬁshery. In 1999,
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries spent 29 percent of the
total budget and employed 68 percent of staﬀ devoted to statistics collec-
tion and compilation, but all primary industries combined provide less
than 2 percent of GDP.
For example, domestic production and usage of coal is a designated se-
ries even though only 1.9 percent of total coal consumption is produced
domestically and only 12 percent of total energy consumptions is coal.
There are three designated statistics on shipping and sailors, although
Japanese commercial ships long ago replaced Japanese crew with foreign-
ers. Even though the industry was all but extinct years earlier, production
of silk and silk worms was a designated statistic until the end of ﬁscal 2002.
On the other hand, surprisingly few resources are allocated for data on
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3. We are grateful to Mr. Masato Aida at So ¯musho for this information.tertiary industries, especially services. There is only one designated series
that covers the service industry on an annual basis, oﬀering basic data on
production, employment, ﬁrm size, and so forth. Even this statistic rotates
among subsectors on a three-year cycle so that the data for each subsector
is available only every third year. There is only one other designated series
that covers the service industry, but this survey is conducted every ﬁve
years and it covers only those not covered in the ﬁrst survey.
As we see more closely later, the weights attached to items in the CPI are
based on the FIES (Family Income and Expenditure Survey), and it is ﬁxed
for a ﬁve-year period, even though the FIES is conducted monthly. Japan
is not unique in this, other countries also have similar delays in adjusting
coverage and weights. In the U.S. CPI, 1982–1984 weights were used until
1996, ﬁnally being replaced by 1993–1995 weights.
Especially for GDP statistics, long lead times are a problem. Preliminary
ﬁgures are not announced until three months after the end of a quarter.
These are revised three months later. The ﬁnal ﬁgure is made available in
December of the next year. Moreover, the inconsistency between quarterly
estimates and the ﬁnal ﬁgures reﬂects underlying diﬀerences in the estima-
tion procedure. The inconsistency and long lead times in GDP statistics
have been known for quite some time, but there seems little hope that any
fundamental measures will be taken to rectify the situation. In the United
States, preliminary quarterly GDP data are announced in eight weeks, and
the ﬁnal ﬁgure is available in about thirteen weeks. In other words, by the
time the preliminary Japanese ﬁgures are announced, the ﬁnal U.S. ﬁgure
has already been announced. The release of the latest CPI ﬁgures is far
more timely. The most recent month’s ﬁgure is released on the Friday of the
last week of each month, whereas in the second ten days of the current
month the CPI for metropolitan Tokyo area is released on the same day.
4.2.2 Lack of Proper Coordination
There is a lack of proper coordination among diﬀerent bodies of gov-
ernment and coordination with nongovernmental institutions is uncom-
mon. As a result, diﬀerent bodies collect similar, if not duplicate, sets of
data. At the same time, in many important areas there is a lack of proper
oﬃcial statistics, due mainly to the fact that the area falls under more than
one ministry’s responsibility. This is especially true in the areas of infor-
mation and communication: Subsets of these are covered rather indepen-
dently by sections of So ¯musho and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and
Industry (formerly, the Ministry of Trade and Industry [MITI]).
Inadequate coordination creates diﬃculties in combining sets of statis-
tics. For example, many statistics on private enterprises and establishments
cover essentially the same universe of ﬁrms, yet each series employs its own
coding method, sample selection methodology, and so forth, with the re-
sult that none of these statistics can be integrated to form a uniﬁed series.
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categories, which means cross-referencing is often diﬃcult and may lead to
erroneous conclusions. The best known example is the apparent inconsis-
tency in personal savings rates in the National Accounts and the House-
hold Saving and Expenditure Survey.
Lack of coordination places a heavy burden on sample respondents, es-
pecially the large ﬁrms that are included in most enterprise-based statistics.
In 1993, more than 25 percent of polled ﬁrms listed on the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change said they had to reply to more than 100 diﬀerent central and local
government surveys each year.4
Rectifying the situation is straightforward in some cases. For example,
many establishment-based surveys cover 100 percent of ﬁrms (their estab-
lishments) with more than ¥1 billion paid capital. It would be easy to use
the same identiﬁcation code for these ﬁrms to facilitate cross-referencing
of a large variety of statistics.
4.2.3 Inadequate Disclosure
Inadequate disclosure of information is especially troublesome in two
ways. First, many published statistics are processed using one or more pri-
mary statistical series, but details of the procedure generally are not avail-
able. The disclosure problem is extremely severe for most of the National
Accounts data, as they incorporate so many diﬀerent statistics. (See Ando
2002 for the problems he faced in his exploration of the measurement er-
rors in savings rate.)
In GDP statistics, the corporate sector includes not only privately in-
corporated enterprises, but also the portion of central and regional gov-
ernmental activities conducted by speciﬁc agencies (such as the postal sys-
tem). There is no precise and reliable information on how to identify which
part of the government activities are included. The problem is not limited
to secondary statistics. The CPI is based on surveys of prices at sample re-
tail stores, but original results are not available. For example, it is conse-
quently not known how adjustment is made for quality change and by how
much. The same problems exist for the WPI.
For economists, an equally, if not more, important problem is govern-
ment unwillingness to make original microdata available to outside re-
searchers. The law explicitly and categorically prohibits use of oﬃcial sta-
tistics for purposes other than the ones speciﬁed in the law establishing
each statistical series or the corresponding ministerial orders. Thus, to ob-
tain original data for designated statistics, one must ﬁle a petition for spe-
cial exclusion. This is a complicated, time-consuming process with no
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4. The preceding results cited are taken from the following survey: Tokeicho ¯sa Ho ¯koku To
no Kinyu ¯ ni Kansuru Jittai Cho ¯sa (Survey on the Burden of Respondents in Oﬃcial Surveys and
Statistics, by So ¯mucho (1994; to become So ¯musho in 2001), summary available at http://
www.stat.go.jp/info/seido/6-1-2.htm.guarantee that permission will be granted (see Matsuda, Hamasura, and
Mori 2000 for details).
The diﬃculty in obtaining original data places severe constraints on out-
side observers, making it diﬃcult even to point out with any reasonable ac-
curacy where problems may be. Concern over the accuracy of CPI arose
partly because many retail ﬁrms started publishing their own price data to
argue that the CPI contains sizable upward bias (see, e.g., Sezon Research
Institute [SRI] 2000). The resulting debate ultimately was unproductive in
part because So ¯musho would not disclose data comparable to those cov-
ered by the retailers.
4.3 CPI Statistics
Japan’s CPI is collected and published by So ¯musho To ¯keikyoku (Statis-
tics Bureau and Center, Ministry of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs,
Posts and Telecommunications). Japan’s CPI is by and large typical of
CPIs collected in most countries. It is essentially a ﬁxed-weight Laspeyres
index with weights taken from FIES, which also is conducted by So ¯musho.
The weights are revised every ﬁve years, incorporating the latest FIES.
Especially since the late 1990s when deﬂationary pressure became ap-
parent, the CPI index has been criticized for its apparent failure to register
the impact of rapidly declining retail prices as reported in the media and by
some of the largest national general merchandise stores (GMSs).5
Compared to the CPI in the United States, there are several notable
diﬀerences in data-collection procedures and lower-level aggregations. The
Japanese CPI includes a larger number of individual items (roughly 600
compared to about 200 in the United States). For each item, Japan uses a
single brand and a single retail outlet within each designated area to sur-
vey prices. Both the outlets and items used are rotated in the United States.
Surveys are prices on speciﬁc days of each month rather than averages
over period or brands, as in the United States. Arithmetic means are used
in every stage of aggregation, rather than geometric means. (The United
States converted to geometric for lower-level aggregation in January 1999,
as recommended by the 1996 Boskin Commission Report.)
4.3.1 Alternative Inﬂation Measures
If the CPI inﬂation rate is so problematic, why not use some other mea-
sures such as the GDP deﬂator or WPI? In fact, all of these are used to mea-
sure inﬂation, and many view the GDP deﬂator as a better indicator than
the CPI. However, the same primary price survey data are used to estimate
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5. The most comprehensive study is Shiratsuka (1997). Shiratsuka (1999) oﬀers a review of
his 1997 monograph and other major studies in English. So ¯musho posts various documents
prepared by the Ministry on this issue at http://www.stat.go.jp/data/cpi/8.html.GDP deﬂators as to estimate CPI and WPI. So, if CPI and WPI data con-
tain measurement errors, they will also appear in other processed statistics
such as the GDP deﬂator.
Moreover, the CPI is a more appropriate measure of overall changes in
the cost of living. In contrast, changes in the GDP deﬂator reﬂect overall
changes in the prices of goods and services produced in the country, not
necessarily those consumed. The diﬀerence can be large and important
when events, such as large increases in crude oil, give rise to major swings
in the ﬁnal price.
Table 4.3 shows the CPI, WPI for ﬁnal consumption demand, and the
GDP deﬂator for household ﬁnal consumption. The CPI and WPI are both
Laspeyres indexes with weights ﬁxed for ﬁve-year periods, whereas the
GDP deﬂator is a Paasche index with weights given by current-year ex-
penditure shares. By construction, inﬂation in the GDP deﬂator has a
downward bias, as opposed to an upward bias in CPI and WPI.
4.3.2 The CPI as the Cost of Living Index, 
the CPI as the Cost of Goods Index
From the viewpoint of standard microeconomic theory, the principal
objective of a CPI is to provide a benchmark for the cost of living index
(COLI). However, as is the oﬃcial view in most other countries, the Statis-
tics Bureau of So ¯musho clearly states that the CPI should be viewed as the
index of the speciﬁc basket of goods it contains—that is, the cost of goods
index (COGI). It does not subscribe to the view that the CPI should be the
best estimate of the COLI. (See Schultz and Mackie, forthcoming, for a
discussion of this incorporating the Boskin report.) Box 4.1 discusses the
CPI as a COLI.
Even though we concur with the majority view among economists that
CPI should serve as a measure of COLI, we also think that COGI, as it is
constructed as an index representing a ﬁxed basket of consumption goods,
has its own merits. Especially as a macroeconomic indicator, the inﬂation
rate measured in terms of changes in COGI is important, given the crucial
role played by the private and social costs of changing nominal prices. Un-
like COGI, a properly deﬁned COLI can change without any accompany-
ing change in nominal prices (for example, due to changes in quality). This
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Table 4.3 Annual Inﬂation Rates, 1900–2000 (%)
Period CPI WPIa GDPb
1990–2000 1.64 –0.55 0.49
1995–2000 0.30 –0.76 –0.32
aFor ﬁnal consumption goods.
bDeﬂator for household ﬁnal consumption. This is a Paasche index using current weights
from FIES. Both factors tend to generate a lower inﬂation rate than the CPI.Box 4.1 CPI as a COLI
Under certain strict conditions, we can derive a group of price
indexes called superlative price indexes (see Diewart [1976] and
Caves, Christensen, and Diewert [1982]) that approximate the
true COLI up to the second order. One index among the group is
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The major advantage of a superlative price index, including the
Tornqvist, is that the index properly incorporates substitutions
among goods and services in response to changes in relative
prices, among other things. Neither Laspeyres (reference-period
ﬁxed weights), nor Paasche indices (current-period ﬁxed weights)
incorporate substitutions. The most serious problem with
Laspeyres as an approximation of a COLI is that the index tends
to overrepresent prices that have risen from the reference period,
thus overstating the impact of price increases. By the same token,
the index underrepresents the impact of price declines. The mag-
nitude of the bias depends crucially on two factors: relative prices
and the degree of substitution across goods and services.
The practical diﬃculty in using Tornqvist or Fischer (geomet-
ric mean of Laspeyres and Paasche) indexes is that they require
current data on expenditure shares. If expenditure shares are con-
tinuously available, one can construct corresponding chained
indexes.
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The important drawback of chained indexes is path depend-
ence. That is, the same magnitude of total price changes results in
diﬀerent price index values, depending on the sequence in which
the changes take place. The problem is quantitatively important in
high-frequency data (See Feenstra and Shapiro 2001 on such bias).can be misleading, especially when quality unadjusted indexes are not
available.
In relation to other price indices, such as WPI, CSPI, and various wage
indices, the COGI is also important in monitoring the dynamics of vertical
price formation. Thus, we agree that the CPI should continue to serve as a
COGI, providing an aggregate measure of nominal price changes.
Even as a COGI, however, the CPI should perform better by incorpo-
rating lower-level substitution more explicitly. Accordingly, there is strong
evidence that consumers substitute brands, shop around, and continue to
shift toward mass retailers with lower prices. Moreover, unless one sub-
scribes to an extremely narrow and rigid deﬁnition of a ﬁxed basket (i.e.,
ﬁxed brand purchased at ﬁxed set of retailers), CPI should move in the di-
rection of COLI at least in these dimensions.
We believe the CPI should serve both COLI and COGI purposes. When-
ever an important diﬀerence arises between the purposes, separate COLI
and COGI series can be compiled. There is no practical or theoretical diﬃ-
culty in this. As a matter of fact, the additional cost of preparing a separate
COLI for diﬀerent groups of households is relatively small, and the current
CPI does include such series. We suspect, however, that the relevant COLIs
for diﬀerent groups diﬀer substantially, once proper attention is paid to
shopping behavior. To incorporate shopping behavior into the COLI, it is
essential that information be collected at the household level.
Whether the CPI is viewed as strictly a COGI or also serves as a COLI,
it is crucial to disclose details of the compilation processes, such as quality
adjustments and brand and sample-store replacements. Without full and
timely disclosure of these details and the original survey results, the extent
to which external monitoring can check potential problems is limited.
4.4 Major Sources of CPI Bias
There are several fairly well-known, if not well-established, sources of
problems in the Japanese CPI, and all are considered sources of upward
bias. One set relates to aggregation procedures and the second to lower-
level data collection procedures (including how discounted prices are han-
dled). Collection procedures, services, quality change, and new products
are covered in this section. Aggregation issues are taken up in later sec-
tions.
4.4.1 Lower-Level Data Collection Procedures
Under current procedures, prices for each item are collected ﬁrst by
specifying the most representative brand for each item, then by selecting
the most representative sample store (usually the one with the largest sales
volume of the item) within each precinct.
The brand selection procedure is problematic. Setting aside the problem
of changes in the leading brand over time, ﬁxing a particular brand in itself
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brands and thus will substitute among brands, especially when one is tem-
porarily discounted. Fixing a particular brand gives unbiased COLI data
if and only if all consumers are completely brand loyal or retail prices of
diﬀerent brands all move together. So ¯musho does not release data on how
many or how often brand replacements occur, but states that it checks the
selection of speciﬁc brands every half year and replaces brands whenever
appropriate.
In the United States, CPI does not ﬁx any particular brand and diﬀerent
brands rotate in each price survey. The U.S. procedure is superior because
the procedure avoids the inherent bias associated with ﬁxing particular
brands. On the other hand, Shapiro and Wilcox (1996) contend that brand
turnover is closely related to CPI inﬂation in the United States because the
bulk of the inﬂation rate is attributable to the imputed price increase regis-
tered for newly surveyed brands and entry-level (new) items when the
sample is changed. That is, if brand A is substituted for brand B in the
sample, the price diﬀerence between the two will be recorded as a price
change aﬀecting the CPI whether or not there is an actual change in the
price of either brand between sample periods.
Selection of a single store within each sample precinct also is problem-
atic because consumers substitute among shopping outlets. Neglecting
store substitution also tends to introduce upward bias.
Discount prices or specials are another issue. Each month the survey
collects prices on the Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday of the week that in-
cludes the 12th of the month. If the price is a discount price, the sample is
void unless the price has been quoted for at least eight days at the time of
the survey. It is not clear how regular and discount prices are deﬁned. In
most cases, the highest selling price seems to be the one deﬁned as the reg-
ular price. It is unclear if the regular price ever changes at each store and,
if so, how often—even though actual prices change quite frequently.
The current procedure thus tends to ignore almost all discount prices of
short duration. However, the bulk of sales of many products, especially
ones easily stored, are concentrated in short periods when prices are dis-
counted.
The extent to which discount sales are used diﬀers systematically across
items, brands, and types of retail outlets. Discounts are widespread and
routinely used by national brands, whereas most generic commodities
without strong brand recognition are rarely discounted. Discounts are far
more common at large supermarkets and specialty stores, but very infre-
quent at small general stores and almost nonexistent in convenience store
chains.
Although there is no a priori reason to believe these measurement errors
inherently generate systematic bias in the measured inﬂation rate, the re-
cent macroeconomic setting and secular changes in the retail industry do
give reasons to suspect that they create systematic upward bias. The share
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toward large supermarkets and discount stores in suburbs and toward in-
ner-city convenience store chains. This may introduce systematic upward
bias to the extent that current CPI procedures subsume some of the pure
price diﬀerences across diﬀerent types of stores as reﬂecting diﬀerences in
service.
Biases created at lower levels can be quantitatively large precisely be-
cause they occur as a result of substitutions over very close substitutes:
over time of the same brand, among diﬀerent brands of the same good, and
among neighborhood stores.
4.4.2 Services
After the 2000 revision, services comprise 48.4 percent of the CPI. There
are no natural measures for the quantity of most services purchased, im-
plying that expenditure data, such as FIES, are ill suited as the alternative
data source for prices. Objective measurement of the quality of services is
even more diﬃcult. For these reasons, we have little to oﬀer on biases from
services.
Compared to commodity prices, there are reasons to believe raw price
data are more accurate for some services in the CPI. For example, most
utility rates and public transportation service prices are uniform and well
documented. For these, there is little or none of the discounting so com-
mon for food and clothing. This applies also for price data on medical ser-
vices. The bulk of payments are covered by public health insurance, and
readily available and highly comprehensive price lists exist for individual
treatments, various fees, and prescription drugs.
Setting aside quality issues, the biggest problem in service categories is
underrepresentation of medical and health care in the CPI, as the weight is
based on consumer out-of-pocket expenditure in the FIES and totally neg-
lects payments for medical insurance. According to the Survey on Medical
Expenditure (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, various years) in
1999, ¥30.9 trillion (8.1 percent of national income) was spent on medical
care. Out-of-pocket expenses covered by FIES were only 14.6 percent of
that. In the current CPI, the weight for medical care is 2.4 percent and for
health care is 1.4 percent, a total of 3.8 percent.
The medical- and health-related items in the CPI are limited to those not
covered by typical health insurance. Thus, nonprescription drugs, physical
check-ups, and the basic hospitalization fee for normal delivery of a baby
are included, but most other medical services are excluded. Not surpris-
ingly, data indicate systematic diﬀerences in price indexes, depending on
who directly pays the cost: the consumer, insurance, public institutions,
and so forth (See Iwamoto 2000 for representative medical price indexes).
It also should be noted that the CPI contains several conceptual ﬂaws in
some other service prices. Especially noteworthy is imputed rent for home
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well known, however, that rented and owner-occupied homes diﬀer greatly
in capacity and quality. Measured rent is likely to include sizable upward
bias to the extent that the recent improvements in the quality of owner-
occupied homes are not properly incorporated. Bear in mind, however,
that given the sheer magnitude of the diversity of dwellings across regions,
types, and vintage, it is a formidable task even to estimate the size of the
bias, let alone correct it.
4.4.3 Quality Change and New Products
Although quality changes and new goods are potentially the most im-
portant source of bias in the CPI, we do not investigate the problems in any
depth here. Instead, we argue two points: First, in principle, the CPI would
beneﬁt enormously from careful and systematic improvements in incorpo-
ration of the eﬀects of quality change and introduction of new products.
Second, there is an important inconsistency between CPI and WPI re-
garding certain groups of items. We suspect the inconsistency stems at least
partially from diﬀerences in quality adjustments in the two indexes. This is
dealt with in a later section.
Some argue that, ultimately, measurement of quality should be aimed at
measurement of contribution to the quality of life. For example, some say
the measurement of medical services should be reformulated to measure
the cost of cure, rather than the cost of treatment as is now the case (See
Schultze and Mackie [forthcoming]). We do not engage in this debate here
except to the extent that it is an aspect of the issue of the role of the CPI as
a COLI, as we noted earlier.
In the current CPI, essentially nothing is done to address the eﬀect on
living costs from introduction of the new products. This is understandable,
given that no established procedure to do so exists. On the other hand, the
long delay in incorporating changes in the consumption basket by itself in-
troduces large and rectiﬁable biases if price declines primarily occur soon
after a product appears and before it is included in the CPI. That seems to
be the regular pattern for many consumer durables, but it is conceivable
that for other types of products, prices rise during the early stage.
It is only in the 2000 revision that the CPI included items such as per-
sonal computers and service charges for mobile telephones. The CPI still
does not include fax machines, printers and other computer peripherals, or
internet service provider charges!
As for quality change, in the current procedure, whenever a sample item
or brand is considered diﬀerent in quality from the previous item, an over-
lap method is used to take account of quality changes. In 2000, the CPI for
the ﬁrst time started using hedonic methods to estimate quality changes in
personal computers, but, as of now, this is the only item utilizing the method.
Few empirical studies in Japan measure quality changes and assess the
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lished results we are aware of that estimate the impact of quality change on
CPI bias. He estimates that underestimates of quality changes result in an
annual upward bias of 0.3 percent to 0.9 percent, with 0.7 percent the point
estimate. However, he notes the estimate is based only on studies of a few
consumer electronics and passenger cars.6
Most of Shiratuska’s work uses data from the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, so it
is not clear if the same estimates apply to later periods. As will be shown,
in the late 1990s, the consumer electronics component of the CPI registers
a lower (actually, larger negative values) inﬂation rate than the comparable
WPI rate.
For the U.S. CPI, Hausman (1999) estimates annual upward bias of 0.8
percent to 1.9 percent for telecom services as a result of not including cel-
lular phone services in CPI until 1998. The potential bias can be substan-
tially larger in Japan because the use of mobile phone increased so fast and
the price declined so dramatically. In 2001, the number of cellular users
surpassed the number of ﬁxed telephone lines in Japan.
So ¯musho (2000) has conducted preliminary estimation of a hedonic
price index for personal computers. They estimate a price decline from the
1995 average, set at 100, to 12.8 by mid-1999. This is a 36.7 percent annual
decline. Thus, if the personal computer had been included in the CPI in
1995, that alone would have reduced the inﬂation rate by 0.2 percentage
points each year during 1995–1999. (The personal computer weight in the
current CPI is 0.54 percent). One can expect similar dramatic price decline
for other items that now command sizable expenditure shares: fax ma-
chines (not included), printers (not included), mobile phones (0.74 per-
cent), internet service providers (not included), and so forth.
More often than not, the same goods and services appear on lists related
to both proper adjustments in quality and timely inclusion of new goods.
This is because the most important quality changes typically take place
when items are relatively new. In this sense, timing is crucial. If an item is
included only after it has become a part of the standard consumption bas-
ket, much of the impact of quality change and consumer surplus associated
with quality-adjusted price declines is missed.
4.5 Aggregation Biases
Aggregation procedures are a problem. The Japanese CPI is a ﬁxed-
weight Laspeyres index. The biases created by using ﬁxed weights and tak-
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6. Shiratsuka (1997) and his associates estimated hedonic price indexes for personal
computers, camcorders, automobiles, and apparel. They found quality-adjusted personal
computer prices declined 25 percent a year from 1990 to 1994, while unadjusted prices fell 3
percent. For camcorders, the annual quality-adjusted decline was 11 percent, but only 6 per-
cent unadjusted. For automobiles, adjusted prices declined 0.4 percent, but increased 4 per-
cent unadjusted.ing arithmetic means are well known. Aggregation bias arises at every stage
in the Japanese CPI.
At the bottom level, one representative brand of each item is chosen for
data collection. This assumes away interbrand substitution and thus tends
to create sizable upward bias. Fixed-weighting problems also appear in the
selection of sample stores. As discussed later, this became serious in the
1990s as sales shifted away from small independent stores to larger chain-
store discount outlets (see table 4.8).
The FIES has a signiﬁcant sampling problem because it does not include
single-person households. Given the large portion of the population living
alone and the substantial deviation of consumption patterns of single-
person households from others, the bias implicit in this procedure is po-
tentially important. Starting in late 2002, FIES is being expanded to cover
single-member households.
In an earlier step to improve data quality in October 2001, So ¯musho
started a new consumption survey covering 20,000 households and focus-
ing on items the basic FIES is ill suited to cover, such as high-priced prod-
ucts purchased infrequently and services. The new survey includes appli-
ances, personal computers, other consumer electronics, mobile phones,
and internet service providers, as well as some services already covered in
FIES. The survey is conducted by a semiprivate research organization and
includes single-member households. Zero or negative inﬂation in recent
years probably has lessened the size of aggregation bias in comparison with
economies with a mild but positive inﬂation rate.
4.5.1 Higher-Level Aggregation Bias
At higher-level aggregation, it is well known that the current ﬁxed-
weight Laspeyres index using arithmetic means tends to produce some up-
ward bias in the CPI. This is the case because whenever relative price
changes, people do tend to buy more of the goods and services whose rel-
ative price declined and buy less of those which have become more expen-
sive. In short, people change the consumption shares with their response
to changes in relative prices. The assumption of ﬁxed weights neglect this
substitution and hence tends to overstate/understate the impact of price
increase/decrease. This problem of using ﬁxed weights is not unique to the
Japanese CPI. The procedure to measure the bias is simple and straight-
forward: Annual expenditure weights from FIES for the eighty-ﬁve lowest-
level categories are used to compute chained Fischer and Tornqvist indexes
that are compared to the CPI, which uses the same price data but with ﬁxed
1995 weights. Table 4.4 summarizes Shiratsuka’s (1997) calculations and
extends them to 1995–2000.
The bias is not large for years since 1995, except for 1999. Relatively large
bias in the CPI inﬂation rate for 1999 (i.e., the change in CPI from 1998 to
1999) probably reﬂects relatively large changes in consumption weights
after the increase in consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent in April 1998.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Compared to chained Tornqvist or Fischer indices, the ﬁxed-weight
Laspeyres generates roughly 0.04 percent upward bias per year in the ﬁve
years through 2000. There is larger bias in earlier periods—on the order of
0.1 percent.
Although the magnitude is not large, aggregation bias is serious because
it always exists and accumulates forever. Thus, it can have a quantitatively
large impact when tracing living standards for generations. Aggregation
bias arises due to the underrepresentation of the scope of substitution
whenever the relative prices of goods and services change over time. The re-
sults indicate that the bias is smaller in the more recent years primarily be-
cause of smaller variations in relative prices.
Notice that a low or negative inﬂation rate per se does not reduce aggre-
gation bias. What matters is changes in relative prices. These results only
conﬁrm that relative price variability at higher-level aggregation is posi-
tively correlated with the inﬂation rate.
4.5.2 Discounts and Intertemporal Substitution
Biases created within each item, an aspect of lower-level aggregation, is
now considered. There are two issues: selection of a particular brand of an
item and how price observations are collected. In a sense, bias at this level
is the easiest to deal with because, in principle, there is not much room for
disagreement. The extent to which diﬀerent brands of an item are substi-
tutable is an empirical question that can be answered with reasonable ac-
curacy if suﬃcient data are collected. Substitutions across brands within
each item is addressed later.
Here the issue is substitution over time of the same brand—that is, the
extent to which consumers can exploit periodic discounts. This appears to
be quantitatively important, and how much substitution occurs depends
primarily on consumer knowledge and the ability to hold inventory at
home. Feenstra and Shapiro (2001) is an early attempt to incorporate
home storage and shopping patterns into CPI measurements (also see
Ariga, Matsui, and Watanabe 2000).
In principle, the upward bias due to the survey procedure described ear-
lier applies only to the level, not necessarily to changes, in the index. The
problem is essentially that the procedure systematically truncates the low
price observations. This truncation may or may not generate upward bias
in the inﬂation rate. Circumstantial evidence indicates, however, that it
does indeed produce sizable upward bias in the measured inﬂation rate, as
retailers reduce average sales price by further lowering the discounted price
or increasing the frequency of discounts.
The easiest way to demonstrate the inﬂation bias created by intertempo-
ral, intrabrand substitution is to compare the actual average purchase price
to hypothetical price data, which the CPI would collect following the data
collection procedure described earlier. For this exercise, we use point of
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(See appendix A for details regarding the data sets).
Table 4.5 covers six selected items sold at sample large-scale retail stores
during the twenty-four months starting April 1995. The results are consis-
tent across all of the items: The current CPI procedure consistently over-
estimates the inﬂation rate because most special-sales prices are dropped
from the survey. Notice that the results indicate that the decline in the av-
erage purchase price occurred primarily as a result of lowering the discount
price or increasing the frequency of the discounts. Moreover, as Shiratsuka
(1997) pointed out, the current procedure substantially increases noise, as
it only sporadically picks up sales discounts. Table 4.5 shows that standard
deviations in the inﬂation rate under the current survey procedure are sub-
stantially higher than those of average purchase prices for most items.
Unfortunately, there is no unambiguous way to estimate the extent to
which the bias due to survey procedures applies to other items in the CPI.
It is known that periodic price discounts (specials and sales) are quite
widespread in most medium- to large-scale retail stores. Discounts typi-
cally apply to processed food, toiletries, cosmetics, household appliances,
and some clothing. In other words, for most items sold at large-scale retail
stores, one expects periodic discounts. Table 4.5 indicates that the current
CPI creates systematic upward biases for these items mostly in the order of
3 percent per year.
4.5.3 Substitution Across Brands
The CPI chooses a single brand to represent the price movement of each
item. In general, ignoring substitutions across brands results in an upward
bias in the level of the cost of living, but it is not certain if it results in any
bias in the inﬂation rate. If the relative price of diﬀerent brands is stable
over time, the bias may well be negligible in computing the CPI.
Figure 4.1 shows three price indexes compiled from point of sale data
prepared by the Sezon Research Institute (POS-SRI) for liquid condiment,
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Table 4.5 Bias Due to CPI Data Collection Procedure (% per year)
Mean Inﬂation Standard Deviationa
Weighted CPI Upward Weighted CPI
Average Procedure Bias Average Procedure
Mayonnaise –1.36 –0.38 0.98 .0148 .0208
Ketchup –3.12 –0.41 2.71 .0195 .0305
Soy sauce –2.25 0.00 2.25 .0343 .0434
Liquid soup base –2.94 –0.30 2.64 .0238 .0429
Laundry detergent –2.73 –0.10 2.83 .0298 .0149

























































sone of the fourteen items included in the 1997 National Survey of Prices,
Special Volume on Bargain Prices. Along with the Tornqvist index for the
item, the ﬁgure shows indexes for the brands that registered the lowest and
the highest inﬂation rate from 1995 to 2000. Variations across brands are
very large indeed.
Table 4.6 shows the intraitem sample variances for the fourteen items
and the monthly inﬂation rate for the corresponding item-level Tornqvist
index. A simple panel regression of monthly item-level price variances on







R2   .0874
The result (standard errors in the parenthesis) indicates that deﬂation
(–ifr) coincides with increase in price variations across brands. These ﬁnd-
ings thus indicate that, at least for these fourteen items, consumers have
ample opportunities to substitute among brands.
In Ariga, Matsui, and Watanabe (2000), we used daily POS data for two
rival brands of curry paste sold at selected supermarket stores. Table 4.7
shows the impact of price discounts on sales volume.
If brand B also is at a discount price, average sales volume of brand A at
a discount price is 57.4, which is 19 percent smaller than the average sales
volume (70.7) at a discount price if brand B is sold at regular price. The im-
pact of brand A’s discounted sales on brand B at discount price is even
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Table 4.6 Mean Inﬂation Rates and Within-Item Variances
Mean Inﬂation Rate (%) Variancea
Instant coﬀee 0.4477 .016
Facial tissue 0.1006 .0062
Mayonnaise –0.2258 .0041
Yogurt –0.1324 .94 • 10–5
Liquid condiments 0.0781 .0080
Fruit juice 0.2465 .092
Fresh milk –1.4649 .019
Sugar –11.8878 .038
Wheat ﬂour 0.2117 .0061
Soy sauce –0.1937 .0043
Cooking oil 0.2850 .0070
Sanitary napkins 0.9755 .052
Laundry detergent –0.0627 .060
Kitchen detergent –0.0738 .0078
aMonthly average for indexes of brand-speciﬁc inﬂation normalized to set the annual average
for 2,000 equal to 1. The variance of mean inﬂation rate across diﬀerent brands within each
item is shown in the second column.larger, more than 30 percent (compare 29.2 against 42.4). On the other
hand, pricing has a much smaller impact on volume at regular price,
around 6 percent to 8 percent (5.0 versus 5.4 for brand A and 2.9 versus 3.1
for brand B).
Given the large impact of periodic price discount on sales, these ﬁgures
suggest the presence of heterogenous consumers, as well as sizable inter-
brand substitutions in response to changes in relative prices. Although
these ﬁndings strongly indicate that price data of any particular brand can
be a highly misleading indicator for overall changes in prices of diﬀerent
brands of each item, it is not possible to provide estimates of the magnitude
of the inﬂation rate bias created by brand substitutions per se. Given the
analysis on intertemporal substitution, it is probably not very productive
to try to estimate the eﬀects alone, as substitution in this aspect is closely
related to intertemporal substitution and periodic price discounts.
There also are diﬃculties from the extremely high rate of new brand in-
troductions and retirement of old brands, particularly among items in the
food, household appliances, toiletry, and clothing groups. Shifts in sales
shares from one brand to another not only are highly frequent but also un-
predictable. This makes it practically impossible to obtain reliable estimates
of substitution elasticities for the wide range of goods in the CPI. Again,
these observations indicate the problem inherent in choosing a single spe-
ciﬁc brand to represent the spectrum of brands of each item. It is far more
satisfactory and actually easier to use price averages across brands.
4.5.4 Substitution Across Stores
According to the current CPI procedure, the survey selects the most rep-
resentative store within each survey precinct for each item. Nationwide,
the survey has roughly 700 precincts. Usually the store with the largest
sales volume is chosen for the item.
Table 4.8shows the changes in shopping points in the National Survey of
Family Income and Expenditure. As expected, regular stores lost shares
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Table 4.7 Substitution across Brands: Curry Pastes
Brand A’s Price
Sales Volume Regular Discounted
Brand A
Brand B’s price is regular 5.4 70.7
Brand B’s price is discounted 5.0 57.4
Brand B
Brand B’s price is regular 3.1 2.9
Brand B’s price is discounted 42.3 29.2
Note: Unit of measure is the average number of sales units per day.across the board in the ﬁfteen years from 1984 to 1999. The decline is es-
pecially large in food.
So ¯musho (2000) explains the selection procedure for precincts and
sample stores. It is not entirely clear, however, to what extent the delay or
failure in changing sample retail stores contributes to selection bias in the
CPI. According to So ¯musho (2000a, 75), “the latest store selection is fairly
close to the 1999 distribution,” which is shown in table 4.8.
Shiratsuka points out that “the shift from department stores and small
general stores to discount outlets has largely subsided,” so that price diﬀ-
erentials have “settled down to a level consistent with the diﬀerence in ser-
vice quality” (1999, 90). However, table 4.8 suggests the shift is still very
much an ongoing process.
The current CPI revises sample store selections in two ways. Every ﬁve
years the most representative store is chosen for each commodity group in
each precinct. This reﬂects changes in market shares across diﬀerent types
of retail shops in each precinct and commodity group. In principle, the CPI
uses the overlap method to correct for underlying diﬀerences in retail ser-
vices between sample stores before and after the changes. Sample stores
also are replaced on an ad hoc basis. This is necessary when stores are
closed or stop selling the sample product. In such cases, price data are di-
rectly connected and no adjustments are made in prices. In the case of ser-
vices, the overlap method is used.
To sum up, the current procedure uses direct comparison methods only
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Table 4.8 Share of Expenditures on Selected Items, by Type of Retail Outlet, 1984–1994 (%)
Regular Department Convenience
Small-Scale Supermarkets Stores Stores Cooperatives Discounta
Total
1984 50.8 28.9 10.0 0.0 4.6 0.0
1994 40.5 30.3 9.3 1.1 6.3 4.0
1999 34.0 35.3 9.1 1.7 5.9 5.4
Food
1984 40.6 44.9 3.5 0.0 7.0 0.0
1994 25.2 49.2 4.1 1.9 10.4 2.3
1999 16.7 57.5 4.5 2.6 9.8 2.7
Appliances
1984 46.3 24.1 15.1 0.0 4.3 0.0
1994 37.1 22.7 10.8 3.1 5.8 12.5
1999 32.3 26.6 9.4 3.0 5.3 16.7
Clothing
1984 36.9 18.1 37.6 0.0 1.8 0.0
1994 33.7 17.7 34.0 1.3 2.1 11.2
1999 28.7 20.5 36.5 1.4 2.3 10.6
Source: So ¯musho (various years).
Note: Row totals do not add to 100 percent because not all store types are included.
aMass-marketing specialty discount stores.for ad hoc sample-store replacements for commodities. One expects that in
the case of an ad hoc replacement, the replacing store is selected in a way
that retains the characteristics of the previous sample store. It is not clear
to what extent overall the overlap and direct comparison methods are used.
As a result, it is not known how much of the price diﬀerentials across stores
are subsumed and assumed away using the overlap method. We suspect
that whenever major changes in the characteristics of sample stores occur,
the overlap method is used so that the CPI attributes the price diﬀerentials
across old and new sample stores to diﬀerences in the quality of retail ser-
vices. In short, even if the CPI has been correctly adjusting the sample store
distribution to changing shopping patterns, most within-brand price diﬀ-
erentials across diﬀerent types of stores are assumed away.
In principle, we agree that some price diﬀerentials reﬂect diﬀerences in
service quality. On the other hand, given the long history of restrictions
on entry of large-scale retail stores and the fact that consumers do shift
purchases from general small-scale stores to supermarkets and mass-
marketing specialty stores whenever such stores are opened in the neigh-
borhood, it seems clear that some of the price diﬀerentials are indeed pure
price diﬀerentials, reﬂecting the local monopoly power element of retail
pricing. Tables 4.9and 4.10oﬀer some evidence, using cross-sectional data
on retail prices of fourteen items at a variety of retail stores at many loca-
tions collected by the 1997 National Survey of Prices.
Table 4.9 shows the diﬀerence in actual retail prices of the items across
diﬀerent types of stores. Ariga, Matsui, and Watanabe (2000) found that
for two brands of curry pastes sold at sample supermarkets 31 percent of
daily observations were of discounted price, but 72 percent of volume was
sold at discount prices. More generally, for a sample of eighteen super-
markets, we found that share of sales at discount prices was 70 percent.
Small general stores and co-ops oﬀer price discounts much less frequently.
We used the survey data to run simple cross-sectional regressions on av-
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Table 4.9 Average Across-Store Price Diﬀerentials for Fourteen Items
Small Mass
Stores Supermarkets Discount Co-ops
Regular price 100 95.4 95.0 94.4
Discount price 78.7 64.9 (17.5%) 68.9 (12.5%) 68.7 (12.7%)
Case 1a 89.4 74.0 (16.7%) 76.8 (14.1%) 81.6 (8.7%)
Case 2b 95.7 74.0 (22.7%) 76.8 (19.8%) 89.3 (6.7%)
Source: So ¯musho (1998).
Note: Small-store regular price = 100. Percentages in parentheses are the discount from the
small store’s price for each of the cases.
aIn determining the average price for Small Stores category, 50 percent of volume is assumed
to be sold at a discount.
bIn determining the average price for Small Stores category, 20 percent of volume is assumed
to be sold at a discount.erage regular and discount prices over a set of dummy variables, including
one representing the presence of nearby rival stores, to indicate that some
of these price diﬀerences reﬂect pure price diﬀerences. The results in table
4.10 show that both regular and discount prices are signiﬁcantly lower
among stores with nearby rival stores.
Speciﬁcally, among small-scale stores with nearby rivals (RS), the regu-
lar price is 8.2 percent lower than in comparable stores without a nearby
rival. The impact of a nearby rival on the discounted price is 15.5 percent.
In other words, the results suggest that a signiﬁcant portion of price diﬀer-
ences between large-scale and small-scale stores reﬂects the eﬀect of local
competition on pricing, rather than diﬀerences in service quality.
The same source shows that 26 percent of small-scale regular stores re-
ported no nearby rival, whereas for large-scale supermarkets, only 3.7 per-
cent reported no nearby rival. Notice also that the impact of a nearby rival
on prices is far smaller in the case of supermarkets, mass-marketing spe-
cialty stores, and co-ops. Setting aside the diﬀerence in geographical sizes
of markets for respective types of stores, the data strongly indicates the mo-
nopolistic power of many small-scale retailers. We conclude from these re-
sults that sizable price diﬀerences exist between small-scale general retail-
ers and large stores, and that some of these diﬀerences reﬂect lack of local
competition for some small-scale retailers.
As indicated in table 4.8, continuing shifts in sales share away from
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Table 4.10 Impact of a Nearby Rival Store on Retail Prices
log (Regular Price) log (Discount Price)










RS   supermarkets .0659 .122
(3.14) (3.98)
RS   mass-discount .0898 .139
(2.17) (2.31)
RS   co-op .120 .123
(2.62) (1.86)
Adjusted R2 .995 .978
Source: So ¯musho (1998).
Notes:Results of OLS cross-sectional regressions. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. RS
  rival store.small-scale to large-scale stores should have generated sizable price de-
clines for average consumers. For the sake of argument, suppose that a 10
percent pure price diﬀerence exists between the two types of retailers on
average. This implies a roughly 0.1 percent upward bias in the CPI from
not accounting for the pure price diﬀerences resulting from shifting shares.
This is computed by multiplying the 6.5 percent decline in the share of
small-scale stores by the 10 percent price diﬀerential over ﬁve years. In any
case, unless we know the extent to which the overlap method is used for
each type of sample store replacement, the eﬀect on CPI bias cannot be es-
timated with any degree of accuracy.
The current store selection method poses other problems. The price
diﬀerences in table 4.9 are likely to generate sizable variations in average
purchase prices across households, depending on residence location, in-
come, member composition, age, and other attributes. Choice of a single
representative store in each precinct for each item inevitably masks these
variations. Such considerations are important if the CPI is used as a COLI.
More generally, the current CPI system is ill suited for incorporating cross-
sectional and intertemporal variations in shopping behavior, and this has
consequences on the COLI.
4.6 A Curious Discrepancy between CPI and WPI
This section compares CPI and WPI data for two groups of commodi-
ties to get some idea of the likely magnitude of the bias created by quality
change.
Until the mid-1990s, with the exception of consumer electronics, the CPI
inﬂation rate tended to be higher than the WPI rate for most items com-
mon to both indexes. Circumstantial evidence suggests signiﬁcant upward
bias in CPI, or downward bias in WPI, or both due to quality changes in
the longer run, although at least since the mid-1990s this may not be the
case. In the last ten years, the annual impact of all quality change on the
WPI is estimated to be around 0.3–0.4 percent by the Bank of Japan
(2001b).
The groups being compared are processed food and consumer electron-
ics. The likely magnitude of quality improvement in processed food in the
WPI is around 0.1 percent per year (Bank of Japan 2001b). Given the mag-
nitude of the estimation error, we take the eﬀect as essentially zero, and this
is the primary reason the group is used in the analysis as the benchmark.
For consumer electronics, the potential impact of quality change on CPI
bias is one of the largest among items in the index.7
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7. Automobiles have the largest eﬀect (–3.1 percent per year) on its subindex. However, the
WPI has indexes for three diﬀerent types of passenger cars, while the CPI has only one. Hence
we decided to use consumer electronics as an example.Using CPI weights, the average inﬂation rates of the two indexes for the
two groups using only items commonly found in both is shown in table
4.11. The result for consumer electronics implies retail prices declined rel-
ative to wholesale prices by as much as 25 percent during the 1990s. If the
sample period is extended back to 1980, the average annual diﬀerence is 1.9
percentage points, which translates into a decline in relative retail price of
as much as 66.4 percent. This is suspect because the distribution margin is
at most around 30 percent of the retail price and available statistics suggest
at most a modest decline in the retail margin during the period—perhaps
a few percentages of the retail price. In other words, either CPI, or WPI, or
both must contain sizable biases.
One possibility is that WPI severely underrepresents the price declines.
In the 1990s, many consumer electronics ﬁrms relocated plants to Asian
developing economies and the import of these goods quickly replaced do-
mestic production. In the 1995 revision of WPI, the Bank of Japan started
collecting import price indices of these products.
The bottom row of table 4.11 shows the weighted inﬂation rate of con-
sumer electronics during 1995–2000, with WPI replaced by the correspon-
ding import price index. The result is essentially the same. Although the
coverage of imported price indexes is far from exhaustive, it seems unlikely
that the deviation can be due solely to the rapid price decline of imports.
Another possibility is that the large diﬀerence in price levels between do-
mestic and imported products is the root cause. The rapid decline of retail
prices could reﬂect rapid replacement of high-priced domestic items by
cheaper imports, even if the imported goods’ prices did not decline faster
than the domestic ones.
It is conceivable that the Bank of Japan has severely underestimated the
underlying quality changes of these products, more so than So ¯musho did
for the CPI. We consider this highly unlikely, given the nature of the debate
between Bank of Japan and So ¯musho on the possible upward bias of CPI.
Another possibility is that CPI overestimates quality change, and so it un-
derestimates the inﬂation rate for this group. There is reason to believe that
this hypothesis has merit and thus needs further investigation.
There are diﬀerences in quality adjustment methods between the two in-
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Table 4.11 Comparison of CPI and WPI (annual percentage rates)
1980–2000 1990–2000
CPI WPI CPI WPI
Food 0.83 0.68 0.25 –0.35
Consumer electronics –3.33 –1.49 –6.12 –3.32
Import price index n.a. n.a. –5.76 –2.49
Note: CPI weights are used for both CPI and WPI. n.a. = not available.dexes. According to Bank of Japan (2001b), the most popular method for
dealing with quality change in the WPI is cost comparison. It is used
fora bout 30 percent of WPI items. In contrast, So ¯musho states that the
CPI uses either the overlap or the direct comparison method. Although
So ¯musho does not reveal how many items are quality adjusted and by
which methods, it says that “whenever a sample brand is replaced, unless
there are reasons to believe that the new and old brands are essentially the
same quality, the overlap method is used” (2000a, 114; author’s transla-
tion). Hence, it is reasonable to say that virtually all substantive quality ad-
justment in CPI is done using the overlap method. Bank of Japan also uses
the overlap method, but only on about 10 percent of WPI items.
Overlap methods can generate sizable overestimate of quality change if
the retail price of the existing brand declines substantially in anticipation
of a forthcoming future brand. Suppose the CPI survey collects prices for
brand b until period t and then replaces it with b  at t   1. Replacement
typically occurs because of a decline in the brand’s market share or its dis-
appearance from the sample store. Overlap methods treat the price diﬀer-
ential between the current and replacement brand b  as reﬂecting an
underlying quality diﬀerence, so the price index for item i is computed as
(2) pi





















where rpb is the survey price of a particular brand. Substantial overesti-
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does not properly represent the quality diﬀerence. In particular, a disap-
pearing brand might be heavily discounted around the time of replace-
ment. In that case, quality improvement is overestimated, and the method
introduces downward bias in the inﬂation rate.
So ¯musho (2000), using color televisions as an example, reports that a
chained index using overlap methods generates a 46 percent decline in the
index for the three-year period 1995–1998, which can be compared to a
decline of 27 percent in the hedonic price index and 25 percent in the pub-
lished CPI index. On the other hand, estimates by Shiratsuka (1997), dis-
cussed earlier, suggest signiﬁcant upward bias in CPI due to underesti-
mation of quality change during the ﬁrst half of 1990s. Our previously
shown results cast some doubt on the alleged upward bias in CPI for this
reason.
All in all, for the late 1990s, we cannot make any deﬁnitive statement on
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certain that there are important inconsistencies in quality adjustments be-
tween the CPI and WPI for at least some product groups.
4.7 Impact of Shopping Patterns on COLI
The current CPI almost totally ignores the impact on COLI of diverse
shopping patterns by diﬀerent types of consumers. This is also true of CPIs
in most other countries. In Japan, there are supplementary CPI indexes in-
corporating diﬀerences in consumption patterns across diﬀerent types of
households. They do not incorporate the impact of shopping patterns on
the respective COLI, however.
In appendix B we develop a simple model of cost minimization and
demonstrate the impact of shopping and storage costs on shopping and
purchase decisions. Two points emerge: First, pricing patterns of retail
stores signiﬁcantly inﬂuence consumer decisions on shopping timing and
purchase. Second, large variations in shopping and storage costs, as well as
average purchase price, result from variations in pricing policy across
diﬀerent types of stores. Moreover, variations in consumer shopping and
storage costs inﬂuence which store is the optimal choice. These results sug-
gest that the variation in COLI across regions and household types can be
much larger than what the current CPI indicates.
4.8 Estimation of Commodity CPI Biases
Inevitably, estimation of bias involves many subjective judgments and is
likely to contain sizable errors. The potential impact of each source of bias
diﬀers across categories, as does our ability to estimate its direction and
magnitude. For this reason, our analysis on bias will be conﬁned to the
commodity CPI; services are not considered.
Commodity CPI comprises 51 percent of overall CPI. We provide two
results: The ﬁrst compares CPI with COLI using unit prices in FIES, the
second is the COLI for fourteen selected items using POS-SRI. The two are
consistent in suggesting sizable upward bias in commodity CPI.
Table 4.12 compares four COLI indexes for a variety of CPI categories.
In the comparison, unit price indexes in FIES are used because CPI item
selection is based on FIES, which collects unit prices for about 200 items.
The large deviation between the two indexes for clothing (2 percent per
year) is consistent with consumers rapidly shifting from domestic to im-
ported and from small-scale to mass-marketing specialty stores. This shift
started with the rapid expansion of several chain stores specializing in
men’s suits and other formal clothing. The department stores, traditionally
the most popular choice for such items, lost share. Beginning in the late
1990s, the shift has been concentrated in more casual clothing and under-
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sales and proﬁts.
Table 4.13, comparing POS-SRI Data with the CPI shows an upward
bias in the CPI on the order of 1.5 percent per year. For six of fourteen
items selected in the 1997 National Survey of Prices, FIES also reports unit
prices. The diﬀerence from the CPI for these groups is again around 1.5
percent per year. These estimates are very close to the bias estimated in
table 4.13. Although the two baskets diﬀer, an index computed by aggre-
gating all FIES items yields a 1.35 percent lower inﬂation rate than the
overall CPI.
The conclusion is that, for at least food and clothing groups, the CPI
since the mid-1990s has sizable upward bias, most likely in the range of 1.5
percent to 2 percent per year. We believe a bias of similar magnitude exists
for other items commonly sold at mass retail stores (such as appliances and
toiletry goods), so that roughly two-thirds of commodity CPI belongs to
groups we believe are biased upward by 1.5–2.0 percent per year.
To be conservative, assume the bias arises only for purchases of these
commodities at large retailers and that two-thirds of purchases are at mass
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Table 4.12 COLI Average Annual Inﬂation in CPI and FIES (%)
(C,C)a (C,K)b (K,C)c (K,K)d CPI-FIESe
1980–2000
Food 0.83 0.70 0.44 0.56 0.27
Clothingf 1.31 1.41 0.20 0.03 1.28
Consumer electronics –8.62 –6.05 –4.80 –3.41 –5.21
Six items in Survey of Prices 0.11 0.45 –0.55 –0.69 0.80
CPI except CE 0.57 0.67 0.32 0.45 0.12
CPI except services and CE 0.63 0.75 0.32 0.59 0.14
Overall CPI versus overall FIESg 1.54 n.a. n.a. 0.64 0.90
1990–2000
Food 0.25 0.20 –0.54 –0.35 0.60
Clothing 0.72 0.73 –1.19 –1.39 2.09
Consumer electronics –6.12 –5.92 –2.89 –3.32 –2.80
Six items in Survey of Prices 0.03 0.38 –0.81 –1.43 1.46
CPI except CE 0.32 0.26 –0.46 –0.40 0.72
CPI except services and CE 0.11 0.20 –0.81 –0.51 0.62
Overall CPI versus overall FIESg 0.89 n.a. n.a. –0.46 1.35
Note: CE = consumer electronics. n.a. = not applicable.
aOriginal CPI ﬁxed-weight Laspeyres index.
bThe CPI price data and FIES monthly expenditure share used to compute a Tornqvist index.
cThe CPI ﬁxed weights and FIES unit prices used.
dTornqvist index using unit prices and expenditure shares from FIES.
eDiﬀerence between CPI inﬂation rate and unit-price inﬂation rate in FIES.
f1987–2000.
gBaskets in two indexes diﬀer.retailers. Applying the low end of the bias range, 1.5 percent per year, sug-
gests a bias of 0.67 percent in the CPI. Using 2.0 percent, the impact on
CPI is roughly 0.9 percent. Even assuming the CPI bias is zero for other
commodities and also for samples taken at small-scale stores, the eﬀect on
overall commodity CPI must be 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent per year. The
diﬀerence between unit price inﬂation in FIES and the CPI inﬂation rate
among comparable items, other than consumer electronics and services, is
about 0.6 percent per year (table 4.12), which is within the range just esti-
mated.
We believe that 0.5 percent to 0.6 percent per year is a conservative esti-
mate of the upward bias in the CPI as a measure of COLI because service
prices, which comprise roughly 50 percent of the overall CPI, have not
been covered in the analysis. Upward biases in many important items in
this category is likely. On the other hand, the comparison of CPI with WPI
indicates a potential downward bias in the CPI.
4.9 Some Suggested Ways to Improve CPI
Japan’s CPI contains upward biases and has other problems. Some of the
problems can be corrected or at least alleviated. The following sections
make some suggestions for improving the CPI.
4.9.1 Upgrade Statistics Sections
The Statistics Bureau of So ¯musho, and most other statistics sections of
Japan’s central government, are seriously understaﬀed and suﬀer from
meager budget allocations. There are fewer highly trained statisticians
than is appropriate for the work, and there are no staﬀ members with ad-
vanced economics degrees. Not only must more people be hired, but the
new hires should be speciﬁcally skilled.
Staﬀ and budget constraints severely limit the options available to im-
prove CPI. For example, use of POS data is highly expensive because
So ¯musho has to purchase them from the outside private sector. Needless to
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Table 4.13 Inﬂation Rates for Sixteen Selected Items (%)
1995–2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Average
POS-Laspeyres –5.15 4.32 –7.66 0.72 –2.85 –6.47 –2.85
POS-Tornqvist –5.05 3.17 –7.95 1.85 –2.80 –5.74 –2.75
CPI –2.15 –2.07 –0.30 –1.00 –0.95 –2.28 –1.46
Notes: The numbers shown are annual inﬂation rates. The ﬁrst two use POS-SRI data (see appendix A
for the data source). The ﬁrst row uses CPI weights and computes Laspeyres index, whereas the second
is a chained Tornqvist using annual weights computed from the sales data in POS-SRI. The last row is
computed using item level indexes and respective weights in CPI.say, collecting POS data in itself is even costlier and practically impossible.
Systematic attempts to estimate hedonic price indexes require large re-
sources for data collection and estimation. In the United States, the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (which prepares the U.S. CPI) quickly incorpo-
rated the recommendations of the Boskin Commission report on problems
with the U.S. CPI (Schultz and Mackie [forthcoming]). Given the budget
and staﬀ size limitations, it seems very diﬃcult for So ¯musho to carry out
similar research with comparable speed.
4.9.2 Improve Data Collection
Many aspects of data collection methods need to be changed, most of
them fundamentally. First, the revision of item selection and weights must
be done more frequently. In principle, to the extent that the CPI uses FIES,
this is a matter of automatic adjustments. FIES is monthly, but annual CPI
revision is a more realistic goal. The need for continuity can easily be met
by tracking CPI component indexes based on weights and item selections
in the past. The additional tasks created by annual revision may not be
large.
Utilizing other oﬃcial data sources in compiling the CPI oﬀers signiﬁ-
cant beneﬁts. For example, the gain from coordinating data collection and
compilation for CPI and WPI is obvious. Coordinating with other agencies
also should be done, especially regarding service prices. In particular, there
should be large gains in accuracy from utilizing other sources of data on
medical and health care and housing expenses.
Seeking alternative data sources is a more fundamental change. Current
collection relies exclusively on surveying sample retail ﬁrms. Given the
time and resource constraint, the margin of improving data quality in com-
modity CPI may be fairly narrow to the extent that the current method is
retained. However, we propose two alternative (complementary) data
methods.
The ﬁrst is to use POS data, which is available on a daily basis for essen-
tially all the brands sold in sample retail stores. Moreover, POS data con-
tain quantity data totally missing in the current survey. Such data are im-
portant for several reasons. Even if So ¯musho retains its current position
that the CPI should be based on representative brands, POS data provide
more accurate and timely information on which brand is the most popular.
Being available on a daily basis makes allowing for sales and temporary
price markdowns easy and straightforward. So ¯musho has used POS for
collecting price information on one item—personal computers—since
2000.
The second complementary data source is to improve and modify FIES
to make it usable as a source of CPI price information. The advantages of
using consumer-side information are numerous. The consistency between
the CPI basket and the actual consumption basket would be improved
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item and expenditure shares of items are the ideal set of information. To
the extent that FIES accurately represents these choices, there should be no
disagreement on how to best represent the consumption basket and rele-
vant purchase prices. Improving the selection of sample retail outlets will
not be necessary, as consumers themselves make the choice, which can be
observed.
Adjustments to incorporate quality change are the most diﬃcult and this
paper has not covered the issue in any detail. We are sure there are impor-
tant inconsistencies between CPI and other price data, especially WPI.
The discrepancies are quantitatively large. Both CPI and WPI will beneﬁt
from proper coordination and joint work by So ¯musho and Bank of Japan.
4.9.3 Create an Independent Research and Appraisal Body
Resources should be used to establish an independent body to conduct
research and systematic appraisal of major statistics. Such research is es-
pecially important for statistics compiled from many primary statistics,
such as the National Accounts. Given the current state of information dis-
closure and the inevitable informational advantage of inside staﬀ, such re-
search must be conducted within the government rather than completely
outsourced, although the research would beneﬁt from using outside con-
sultants.
The Statistics Council is a committee overseeing statistics collection and
compilation activities of the central government. Although in the past the
council made important policy recommendations to improve the oﬃcial
statistics, its current abilities are limited. Like other government councils,
members are nongovernment oﬃcials and meet only a few times a year.
Without a research staﬀ working on a regular basis to monitor oﬃcial sta-
tistics, its recommendations are necessarily abstract in nature and often
too late. Given the autonomy of individual ministries, it is unclear to what
extent the council has inﬂuence on changes in individual statistics pro-
duced in diﬀerent ministries.
4.10 Conclusion
We have employed a variety of data and alternative aggregation evalua-
tion methods to estimate biases in Japan’s CPI. The results strongly suggest
the presence of sizable upward bias in the commodity CPI. Our best esti-
mate is at least 0.5 percent per year, excluding biases in services and from
quality changes. The true bias is likely to be larger than this estimate, but
far more extensive research is needed to obtain a more reliable ﬁgure.
After a journey into a maze of price data, we come back yet again to one
of our ﬁrst points: The Japanese government should allocate far more re-
sources to collection, compilation, and timely disclosure of statistics. Al-
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1980s, the need for oﬃcial statistics is obvious and compelling. No private
sector entity can realistically replace the statistics collection activities of
the central government.
The potential beneﬁt from improvement in indexes such as the CPI can
be enormous, given that so much decision making is linked explicitly or im-
plicitly to the CPI. Although many suggestions for improvements can be
implemented within the current budget and staﬀallocations, the more fun-
damental, necessary changes require sizable increases in budget and staﬀ.
We have pointed out several times the need for coordination within the
government. This is straightforward. Statistics based on the same popula-
tion of samples should use compatible data strata and the same method for
coding, and the actual surveys should be merged to the maximum extent
possible in order to minimize costs to respondents. Furthermore, there
needs to be an independent body within the government conducting re-
search and appraising the statistics.
Although we have focused on data collection and lower-level aggrega-
tion issues in CPI mismeasurement, we concur with the majority that the
problems associated with quality adjustments and introduction of new
goods are by far the most important and challenging. Moreover, shopping
behavior and retail competition needs to be incorporated into CPI. These
and other issues are left for future research. The central message of this pa-
per is the need for fundamental changes in the way CPI is collected and
compiled.
Appendix A
Comments on the Data
Four sets of data are used in the analysis of potential mismeasurements of
CPI.
1. FIES (Somusho, various years)
The CPI uses this survey for the selection and weights of items. Aside
from the expenditure records of the roughly 8,000 sample households,
FIES also reports average unit purchase prices for 200 items. We use these
unit price data as the benchmark for COLI estimates.
There are three major problems with using these unit prices as the COLI.
First, the data cover only subsets of consumption expenditure and do not
cover services. Second, they are averages of nominal purchase prices and
do not incorporate any changes in quality. Third, there are large monthly
ﬂuctuations in the data, partially reﬂecting measurement errors.
There are several advantages, however, over the current CPI as the
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choices by sample households of items, brands, quality, and diﬀerent types
of stores, thus incorporating substitutions by households across the same
categories. To the extent that quality changes not reﬂected in prices are not
quantitatively important, the unit price and expenditure data provide the
most natural measure of COLI. Another notable advantage is that the sur-
vey can be used to estimate COLI across diﬀerent types of households: Al-
though the current CPI supplements include a CPI series for several diﬀer-
ent types of households, they incorporate only the diﬀerences in weights
across households (using the common average prices taken from the Sur-
vey of Prices).
2. 1997 National Survey of Prices, Special Volume on Bargain Prices
(So ¯musho 1998)
This survey selected sixteen items and collected cross-sectional data on
regular and discount prices across regions, types of stores, and variety of
other attributes, such as location characteristics and store sizes. We use
data for fourteen of these sixteen items. We deleted two items, eggs and
beef, because of the potentially large quality diﬀerences across samples.
3. POS-SRI (SRI, various years)
The POS data are compiled by the SRI on sixteen items for the seventy-
two month period January 1995 through December 2000 for twenty stores
in metropolitan Tokyo belonging to a national chain of supermarkets. The
report provides average monthly prices and sales separately for regular and
discount sales. We use the same fourteen items selected above.
4. POS-DEI (DEI, various years)
The POS data compiled by the DEI includes six items among the four-
teen selected items above. The data are daily price and sales records for
roughly 320 brand-store combinations for twenty-four months between
April 1995 and March 1997.
Appendix B
Shopping-Storage Model
Consider a household that consumes at constant rate c per day. Assume it
visits a retailer each 1/s days. The price of the consumption good is ran-
domly drawn from a known distribution F(p). Normalize this price so the
highest price is 1. Shopping costs are   per visit, storage cost is ε per day
per unit, and costs associated with stock-out (i.e., running out of stocks or
inventory) are ignored. For simplicity, assume the same amount, q, is pur-
chased on each visit if the price is below some threshold level, p ˆ. Since the
amount purchased per visit must on average equal consumption (c), then
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Thus the amount of purchase per visit is given by





The average time needed to consume the stored good is q/c. On average, the
amount in storage is half the amount purchased, so the average storage









The household minimizes average total cost (per unit of time) by the choice
of p ˆ and s, taking  , ε, and F as given.
(A4) min
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The POS-DEI data set can be used to obtain an empirical price distri-
bution for the simulation. The data include daily sales and price data for
six items sold at fourteen sample stores. Each data item includes twenty to
thirty diﬀerent brands. The top ﬁve brands by unit sales are chosen from
each store for the simulation. The data span the two-year period, 7 April
1995 to 7 April 1997. Daily price data are used to compute the kernel price
density function for each brand, each item, and each store.8
The range of parameters we used in simulation are:
c   0.2 (one unit of purchase is equal to 5 days’ consumption)
ε   0.001 ~ 0.01
   0.05 ~ 0.14.
All are measured in rates per day. For example, ε   0.001 is equivalent
to depreciation at 0.1 percent per day if the good is purchased at the regu-
lar (high) price. Using the minimum wage in Okinawa (the lowest) of
around ¥600 per hour to set the low end and assuming about one to two
hours for shopping, shopping cost per visit ranges from ¥500 to ¥1,400,
which translates to 5 percent to 14 percent of ¥10,000 of groceries. The up-
per limit corresponds to the roughly two-hour minimum wage in the Tokyo
metropolitan area (  ¥708 per hour).
Table 4B.1 shows that across-store variations in total shopping cost and
average purchase price are large. For the top ﬁve brands, total shopping
cost varies by over 8 percent between store eight, the lowest, and store two,
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8. The pricing patterns are not uniform, and the optimal shopping behavior incorporating
the periodic price discounts are highly complex. For simplicity, we assume a random drawing
of prices from the empirical price distribution. See Ariga, Matsui, and Watanabe (2000) for
the dynamics of pricing strategy and shopping behavior.the highest. For average purchase prices, the range is also more than 8 per-
cent (between stores eight and two). If consumers choose to buy the cheap-
est product, variations are even larger: more than 12 percent in total costs
(stores nine and one) and close to 13 percent in average purchase prices
(stores four and one). Variations in total shopping costs are smaller than
those for average purchase prices because volume shopping of discounted
items increases inventory holding costs.
Notice that the two co-ops tend to be more expensive, especially for bar-
gain hunters. This reﬂects the fact that periodic discounts are less common
in those stores than in supermarket chains.
Across-store variations in pricing patterns alone can give rise to sizeable
variations in shopping frequency and storage. The other side of this fact is
that consumers with diﬀerent shopping and storage costs choose diﬀerent
stores, even if all the stores are identical except for the pricing policy. This
follows from the large variation in optimal shopping and storage costs
across stores even after controlling for unit shopping and storage costs. For
example, when   0.05 and ε 0.001, the shopping cost for the top-selling
brand of item one varies between 0.045 and 0.113 and storage cost varies
between 0.023 and 0.057.
To  demonstrate this, table 4B.2 shows the cost-minimizing choice of
store as unit shopping and storage costs are varied for the top-selling brand
of item one. In this speciﬁc case, store ﬁve minimizes the total shopping
cost for those with lower shopping and storage costs. For those with some-
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Table 4B.1 Variations in Total Cost and Average Purchase Price across Fourteen
Stores (%)
Total Cost Average Purchase Price
Top 5 Top 5
Sample Store Brands Cheapest Brands Cheapest
1. Co-op 1 +3.42 +8.75 +2.46 +10.33
2. Co-op 2 +3.51 +8.17 +2.65 +7.83
3. National chain A1 –2.731 –0.33 –6.15 +1.51
4. National chain A2 –0.58 –3.03 –2.83 –2.56
5. Unknown –2.02 +6.62 –6.55 +8.16
6. Unknown +0.26 –1.10 –2.33 –0.85
7. Unknown –0.71 +8.06 –2.66 +9.66
8. Unknown –4.74 +0.92 –6.63 +1.36
9. National chain B1 –2.53 –3.38 –3.49 –1.11
10. National chain B2 +.00 +2.68 –1.68 +6.64
11. Regional chain C1 –4.02 +2.44 –6.60 +6.67
12. Regional chain C2 +0.19 +2.23 –1.10 +4.87
13. National chain D1 +0.23 +3.00 –0.61 +4.20
Note:Numbers shown are percentage diﬀerences from Store 14 (not shown), which is used as
the benchmark.what higher costs, store two becomes the best choice, reﬂecting the fact
that the optimal shopping and storage policy for store ﬁve involves sizable
purchase at occasional but deep discounts. At even higher shopping and
storage costs, the optimal choice shifts to store nine.
This example is not exceptional. Among the 3,000 simulation cases, each
of the fourteen stores is the cost-minimizing choice in at least one case, al-
though store ten has only one such case. Store three is the overall winner,
being the best choice in 509 cases.
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Japan’s distribution sector employs about one-sixth of the nation’s labor
force and accounts for around one-eighth of the gross domestic product
(GDP), large enough to matter for any economy-wide assessment of barri-
ers to growth and eﬃciency. Moreover, the phrase “ineﬃcient distribution”
has been repeated so many times in reference to Japan that one might sup-
pose the evidence of gross distortion is overwhelming: It is not.
Certainly, regulatory limits on large stores have had an eﬀect on the
numbers of stores of diﬀering formats, but the undeniable peculiarities of
Japan’s distribution sector can be explained by the fundamentals: car own-
ership, size of dwelling, and geography. Accounting for such fundamentals
explains much of the variation in retail density between Japan and other
countries, as well as across prefectures within Japan. Moreover, changes in
these factors can be related to changes in the structure of retailing.1
This chapter does three things: First, it compiles facts on the state of
Japan’s distribution system and puts them in historical and international
context. This includes an explanation of retail store density and its relation
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1. Other investigators who argue that factors besides regulation are important in discus-
sions of Japan’s distribution system include Nariu (1994), Maruyama et al. (1991), and Miwa
and Ramseyer (2002). For an overview of my work and that of some other scholars, see Flath
(2000, chap. 14).work behind the still widely held view that regulation, in particular the
Large Store Law (repealed in 2000), is the key determinant of the structure
of Japan’s distribution system, and then derives some testable predictions
about what this implies. Third, it provides new evidence on whether the
testable predictions are true. This includes looking at diﬀerences among
prefectures and over time in retail density and format.
5.1 Characteristics of Japan’s Distribution Sector
The peculiarities of Japan’s distribution sector include the myriad of
small stores and lack of large stores, multiple wholesale steps, and ubiquity
of vertical restraints. Some relevant data are in table 5.1.
In the late 1990s, Japan had eleven stores per thousand inhabitants, al-
most twice the United States and four times the United Kingdom levels.
The typical U.S. supermarket in 2000 was almost ﬁve times the size of
the Japanese equivalent, which was not quite the size of two basketball
courts. Many stores in Japan are family enterprises with even smaller
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Stores per 1,000 persons (U.S. 1996, Japan 1997)a 6.1 11.2
Workers per store (U.S. 1992, Japan 1997) 11.7 5.1
Number of typical supermarketsc (U.S. 2000, Japan 1999)d 31,830b 18,709
Average store’s ﬂoor space in m2 (U.S. 2000, Japan 1999)d 4,143e 832
Average store’s annual sales in respective millions (U.S. 2000, Japan 1999)d $12 ¥895
Long and Complex Wholesale Marketing Channels
Percentage of labor force employed in
Wholesale (1990–1993) 4.1 8.0
Wholesale (Japan 1996–1997, U.S. 1997) 3.8 5.9
Retail (1993) 11.4 10.4
Retail (Japan 1996–1997, U.S. 1997) 10.9 11.2
Percentage of wholesale sales to other wholesalers:f
1985–1986 25 42
1997 n.a. 35
Source: Data are from table 5.2, except as indicated.
Note: n.a.   not available.
aThe United Kingdom had 3.4 in 1994.
bStores with annual sales of $2 million or more.
cIn Japan, called “food specialty stores.”
dFor Japan, MITI (various years), and for the United States, the U.S. Food Marketing Institute (avail-
able at http://www.fmi.org/facts_ﬁgs/keyfacts/).
eThat is 44,600 square feet, which is slightly smaller than a U.S. football ﬁeld.
fFor Japan, MITI (various years), and for the United States, Ito and Maruyama (1991).ﬂoor space. The average number of workers per store in Japan is half the
U.S. ﬁgure.
Fragmentation of the retail sector in Japan is accompanied by long and
complex wholesale marketing channels. This is evident in several statistics.
Japan’s distribution sector employment is disproportionately concentrated
in wholesaling compared to the United States, and the fraction of whole-
salers’ revenue from sales to other wholesalers is much higher in Japan.
Finally, the ubiquity of manufacturer-imposed pricing rules, customer
assignments, and stipulations of exclusivity can be judged from the large
fraction of wholesalers reporting participation in manufacturer-initiated
distribution keiretsu: The ﬁgure was 45 percent in 1992, although this is
down from 70 percent in 1986 (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency
1994, 180, table 9). No direct comparison with the United States can be
made, but such practices frequently run afoul of U.S. antitrust laws and
thus undoubtedly are less widespread.
5.2 International Perspective
This section presents a comprehensive comparison of Japan’s distribu-
tion sector with those of other nations. Table 5.2 depicts statistics for the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member countries on density of retail stores, employment per store, and
value-added and employment in wholesaling and retailing. The countries
are listed in ascending order of stores per thousand inhabitants in the mid-
1990s. Japan is in the bottom third of the list, having moved up since 1982
when it had 14.3 stores per thousand.
A simple index of the average productivity of labor employed in the dis-
tribution sector relative to the average productivity of labor in the overall
economy can be obtained by dividing the share of distribution sector
value-added in GDP by the share of distribution sector employment in the
total labor force. Countries with higher standards of living (i.e., relatively
high gross national product (GNP) per person in purchasing power parity
(PPP units) tend to have wider discrepancies in average labor productivity
between distribution and other sectors. (The United States is a regression
outlier, but Japan is not). This has a simple interpretation: It reﬂects the
generally slower pace of technical change in services compared to manu-
facturing something ﬁrst noted by William Baumol.2
Japan’s index stands at 0.69, which is below the 0.75 average for all the
countries. This is expected, given the high standard of living. (The United
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2. A simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the natural logarithm of the labor
productivity index (for 1996–1997) on the natural logarithm of GNP per person measured in
purchasing power units (for 1998) is ln (Index)  4.1 – 0.45 ln (GNP per person in PPP units),















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.States does not ﬁt the pattern; its index of 0.92 is above the international
average.) The upshot is that the variation in the index across countries
probably is more reﬂective of international diﬀerences in average produc-
tivity of manufacturing than of distribution. Countries with lower stan-
dards of living tend to have more stores per person and smaller average
store size (measured as average employment per store). The association of-
ten made between Japan’s ubiquity of small stores and economic back-
wardness is based on this pattern.
5.3 Explaining Retail Store Density
There are two broad types of economic models for explaining the over-
all density of retail stores: the social optimality approach, which presumes
that the density of stores attains the economic optimum without explicitly
modeling how prices are set, and the explicit pricing and free entry ap-
proach, which presumes that the density of stores is the maximum consis-
tent with positive proﬁts given some explicit model of pricing by ﬁrms.
Flath (1990) and Matsui and Nariu (2001) adopt the social optimality ap-
proach; Heal (1980) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) model pricing ex-
plicitly and presume free entry.
The comparative statics of store density are qualitatively the same for
both types of models. A proliferation of stores shifts some costs of storing
and transporting goods from households to the distribution sector. Thus,
it is appropriate to base empirical analysis of international variation in re-
tail density on factors associated with the costs of transporting and storing
goods of both households and ﬁrms. This is exactly the approach taken by
Flath and Nariu (1996) using data from the early 1980s. Here that exercise
is repeated with more recent data.
Table 5.3 presents data on some variables associated with the costs and
beneﬁts of a proliferation of stores for various OECD nations, mostly from
around 1996. The variables are proxies for things that aﬀect the relative
eﬃciency of households and ﬁrms at storing and transporting goods.
Crowded living space (CRWDNG) increases willingness to pay a pre-
mium to shop nearby. Car ownership (CARS) lowers household costs of
shopping and thus lowers the premium. The more urbanized an economy
(URBAN), then for any given expansion in the number of stores per per-
son, the smaller the eﬀect on the average distance between stores and resi-
dences, and so the smaller marginal beneﬁt from proximity. If a nation is
geographically compact (LENGTH) like Japan, rather than dispersed over
half a continent like the United States, the added cost of restocking a mul-
tiplicity of stores is reduced. A proliferation of trucks (TRUCKS) and the
infrastructure of roads that make it worthwhile to use trucks lower the
added costs of restocking a multiplicity of stores as opposed to a smaller
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 5.4shows that all of these contribute to the cross-country variation
in number of stores per person in the expected way. The estimates in the
ﬁrst two columns include the average number of persons per room as an ex-
planatory variable and a proxy for the dearness of household storage
space. This variable is available only for some of the countries. Excluding
it, and thus enlarging the sample, narrows the standard errors of estimates
of the other coeﬃcients. This possibly reinforces conﬁdence that the results
are qualitatively valid.
Japan is not a regression outlier. Stores per thousand persons predicted
by regressions excluding Japan are 11.8 with crowding and 11.7 without,
statistically indistinguishable from the actual value of 11.3. These results
very much resemble those obtained in Flath and Nariu (1996) for a slightly
diﬀerent set of countries using data from around 1980.
The conclusion remains that Japan’s relatively high density of retail
stores is due to its paucity of private cars, conﬁned household living space,
geographic centricity, and superabundance of trucks. All of this pointedly
leaves regulation out of the picture. Partly this reﬂects the lack of a suitable
proxy for regulation that can be included in the regression equation, but it
also reﬂects a judgment that regulation is a corollary of economic variables
like the ones already in the equation. I return to this point later.
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Table 5.4 OLS Regressions Explaining International Variation in Density of Stores
With Without
CRWDNG CRWDNG
With Japan Without Japan
Variable CRWDNG Excluded CRWDNG Excluded
Constant 3.4 3.5 5.6 5.6
(1.9) (1.8) (5.2) (5.1)
URBAN –0.4 –0.4 –1.4 –1.4
(–0.4) (–0.4) (–1.7) (–1.7)
ln CARS –0.3 –0.3 –0.6 –0.6
(–1.0) (–1.0) (–2.9) (–2.8)
ln TRUCKS 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(2.1) (1.9) (2.6) (2.4)
ln LENGTH –0.3 –0.03 –0.4 –0.4
(–2.0) (–1.9) (–2.8) (–2.8)
ln CRWDG 0.6 0.6 n.a. n.a.
(1.5) (1.5)
Number of observations 23 22 28 27
R2 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.41
Predicted value of STORES for Japan, 
t-test statistic for diﬀerence from  n.a. 11.8 n.a. 11.7
actual value (11.3) n.a. (0.08) n.a. (0.13)
Note: Dependent variable   ln STORES. Coeﬃcients, with t-statistics in parentheses. n.a.   not appli-
cable.5.4 Wholesale Channels
The focus so far has been on the density of stores. A related issue is the
extent to which Japan’s complex wholesale marketing channels are induced
by its high retail store density, as opposed to reﬂecting some idiosyncrasy.
Proliferation of stores induces branching of logistical arteries to econo-
mize on transport costs. Such branching does not by itself imply a multi-
plicity of wholesale steps, but would seem to lower the costs of a profusion
of wholesalers.
Evidence suggests Japan’s high retail density and wholesale complexity
are intertwined. Nariu and Flath (1993) construct estimates of the average
number of steps in matched wholesale industries of Japan and the United
States for the early 1980s. Besides conﬁrming that Japanese wholesale
channels have, on average, more steps (1.8) than U.S. ones (1.4), we also
showed that the variation in number of steps across wholesale marketing
channels is highly correlated between Japan and the United States, and for
consumer products, it is also related to the relative density of stores.3
In other words, there are common inﬂuences operating on the length of
wholesale channels in both countries. Also, the number of wholesale steps
in Japan is greater for products (such as food) that have many retail stores
compared to the United States. This suggests that Japan’s elephantine
wholesale sector is to some extent due to its proliferation of stores.
5.5 The Large Store Law
The regulation that bears most directly on the density of retail stores in
Japan is the Large Store Law. It is the essential reason why Japan has far
fewer department stores and general merchandise superstores per person
than the United States, as McCraw and O’Brien (1986) were early to rec-
ognize.
Bureaucratic obstacles have been placed on establishment of large stores
since the Department Store Act of 1937. Suspended in 1947, but reinstated
in 1956, it required approval of the national government for the opening of
the new department stores anywhere in Japan. In 1974, the Large Scale Re-
tail Store Law replaced the Department Store Act. It made the extent of
ﬂoor space, rather than the nature of the store, the criterion for necessitat-
ing approval. The cut-oﬀ was 3,000 square meters in the largest cities and
1,500 square meters everywhere else. At the time, almost all stores larger
than the cut-oﬀs were department stores. In 1978, the law was completely
revamped to broaden coverage to include all new stores over 500 square
meters, which meant it would apply to many grocery stores.
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3. In Nariu and Flath (1993, 94, table 6-3) we present an OLS regression: 0.30   0.60 (num-
ber of steps in matching U.S. wholesale industry)  0.09 (stores per household in Japan divided
by stores per household in the United States for retail category corresponding to the wholesale
industry), where t-stat   4.1; t-stat   3.3; number of observations   24; and R2   0.57.The process of securing approval to open a large store was torturous,
typically requiring two years or longer. The process, directed by the Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), involved hearings before
local panels that included owners of existing stores that would suﬀer if the
proposal was approved. The panels tended either to recommend against
approval or propose restrictions on the hours or days the store could oper-
ate. In many cases they proposed such onerous requirements as oﬀering of
classes in cultural activities, like calligraphy or ﬂoral arrangement, at
prices that did not cover costs. The MITI tended to adopt these recom-
mendations and proposals; Larke (1994) oﬀers further detail on the pro-
cess. Unsurprisingly, following adoption of the 1978 amendments, appli-
cations to open new stores dropped to a trickle: in 1984 there were fewer
than 500.
In 1989, the U.S. government identiﬁed the Large Store Law as a struc-
tural impediment to the sale of U.S.-made consumer products in Japan, ar-
guing in negotiations with Japan for repeal or relaxation of the law. Japan
responded ﬁrst by amending the law in 1992 to shorten the process for re-
viewing applications, then in 1994, by raising the cut-oﬀ to 1,000 square
meters, which is about one-fourth the size of the typical U.S. grocery store.
As shown in table 5.5, the number of large stores in operation did in-
crease after 1994. However the overall number remains low compared to
the United States. In 1997, there were only around 24,000 stores larger than
1,000 square meters in all of Japan.
In May 1998, the Diet replaced the old law with a new one (actually with
three new laws) that place details of the regulation of large stores under
control of prefectural governments but mandates that they consider only
environmental factors, such as noise and traﬃc, and not any economic
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Table 5.5 Number of Large Stores in Japan, 1985–1999
Large Stores
All Stores
Class 1a %c Class 2b %c Total %c Total %c
1985 3,662 n.a. 9,624 n.a. 13,286 n.a. 1,628,644 n.a.
1988 4,027 3.2 10,605 3.3 14,632 3.3 1,619,752 –0.2
1991 4,429 3.2 11,082 1.5 15,511 2.0 1,591,223 –0.6
1994 3,351 –8.9 14,292 8.8 17,643 4.4 1,499,948 –1.9
1997 4,350 9.1 17,542 7.1 21,892 7.5 1,419,696 –1.8
1999 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 23,897 4.5 1,406,884 –0.5
Source: MITI (various years).
Note: n.a.   not applicable.
aClass 1 includes larger stores (over 3,000 square meters in most regions, 6,000 square meters in selected
wards of Tokyo and other large cities).
bClass 2 covers remaining large stores. In the 1999 Census of Commerce the distinctions were aban-
doned.
cAnnual average percentage change since prior census.harm to incumbent owners of small stores. The line between environmen-
tal factors and economic ones is suﬃciently fuzzy that some prefectures
may actually enact more severe restraints than existed under the previous
regime (although I consider this unlikely). Other prefectures may remove
the restraints on large stores altogether.
5.6 Regulatory Distortions
Regulatory distortions deﬁnitely exist in Japan’s distribution sector;
table 5.6 summarizes them. The sparseness of large stores clearly is the re-
sult of regulations. Restricting the number of large stores may have had a
secondary, distorting eﬀect on Japan’s foreign trade insofar as imported
consumer products until the 1990s were generally more eﬀectively distrib-
uted through large, upscale department stores, such as Mitsukoshi and
Takashimaya.
The multiple wholesale steps and disproportionately large employment
in wholesaling may in large part also be a secondary eﬀect of the prolifer-
ation of small stores and thus an indirect result of regulatory protection of
small stores. For example, Nariu and Flath (1993) oﬀer a regression equa-
tion linking multiplicity of wholesale steps and proliferation of stores.
Regulations regarding inward foreign direct investment (FDI) may have
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Table 5.6 Regulations Distorting Distribution Sector Resource Allocation
Nature of Eﬀect on 
Regulation Distribution Sector Comment
Large Store Law  The law severely limited number of  The law was repealed in 1998, but 
1974–2000 stores with large ﬂoor space, includ- in eﬀect until April 2000 and ad-
ing department stores and general  ministered by national government.
merchandise superstores and con-
tributed to survival of small tradi-
tional stores.
Large-Scale Retail  The law was enacted with repeal of  The law vests prefectures and mu-
Store Location Law  the Large Store Law. nicipalities with authority to limit 
2000–Present large stores (1,000 square meters 
or greater). Supposedly, criteria is 
to be conﬁned to environmental 
factors only, such as noise and 
traﬃc, but skepticism is warranted.
Automotive inspection  The Road Vehicles Act (revised 1995)  This usually entails purchase of 
(shaken) mandates comprehensive safety in- numerous replacement parts. The 
spections of private passenger vehicles  cost inhibits car ownership and 
every two years beginning with the  thus helps perpetuate the advan-
third year the car is in operation. tage of nearby small neighborhood 
stores over larger, more distant 
stores.had a relatively large eﬀect on distribution. A disproportionately large share
of FDI in Japan (and elsewhere) is in wholesaling. Japan’s vanishing small
stock of inward FDI, in comparison with the United States and the Euro-
pean Union (EU), has been linked to Japanese government restrictions re-
laxed around 1980. The relative absence of foreign-aﬃliate wholesalers in
Japan could inhibit competition and protect ineﬃcient domestic incumbent
producers and distributors. (For a close investigation of FDI in Japan’s
wholesale industry and its eﬀects on import penetration, see Flath 2001.)
Enforcement also matters. Vertical restraints are often presumptively in
violation of the antimonopoly law of Japan, but they nonetheless appear
to be widespread. Penalties for violations are notoriously weak and the re-
sources devoted to enforcement are quite parsimonious. See Flath (1989)
for a discussion of vertical restraints in Japan.
Large stores do not necessarily compete only with small ones: they also
complement them, perhaps oﬀering agglomeration economies. In other
words, there are possible negative eﬀects on small stores from regulatory
limits on large ones. Empirical analysis is needed here.
5.6.1 Evidence Regarding Regulatory Distortion
As a ﬁrst pass at assessing whether the distorting eﬀects of these regula-
tions might be signiﬁcant, consider some data from the McKinsey Global
Institute (2000). The authors construct estimates of value-added per hour
of labor across stores of diﬀerent kinds in Japan and the United States in
the mid-1990s. They conclude that traditional mom-and-pop stores in
Japan have lower average labor productivity than do large stores in Japan
and that they account for a disproportionately large share of total labor in-
put, as compared to the United States (table 5.7).
Overall average labor productivity in Japan’s retail sector is only about
half that of the United States. Closing that gap would increase Japan’s
GDP measurably. How much? Here is a rough calculation. Suppose, for the
sake of argument, that only regulatory barriers limit the number of general
merchandise stores and supermarket groceries and that eliminating those
barriers would double the labor hours that each group worked in 1997 (to
roughly match the U.S. pattern), shifting workers from traditional stores.
Also suppose that as this occurred, value-added in traditional stores fell in
proportion to the withdrawal of labor, while value-added in other stores re-
mained unchanged as wages displaced their proﬁts. Each year this would
eliminate a deadweight loss equal to about 0.25 percent of Japanese GDP.4
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4. If labor hours in general merchandise stores and supermarkets doubled from the 1997 lev-
els with no change in value-added (as wages displaced proﬁts), the value-added per hour would
fall by half in each. The deadweight loss thus eliminated equals the area of a Harberger trian-
gle with right sides equal to the initial labor hours and half the initial value-added per labor
hour. In other words, the recovery of deadweight losses amounts to about 25 percent of initial






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Furthermore, suppose that as a result of the changes in retailing, Japan’s
wholesale sector also evolved to more resemble U.S. wholesaling in terms
of labor productivity. Employment would fall by 2 percent to 4 percent of
the labor force, freeing millions of workers for employment elsewhere in
the economy. If this reasoning holds any validity, the distortions aﬄicting
Japan’s distribution sector are enormous. But the calculation is highly sus-
pect.
With the obvious diﬃculties in measuring labor hours and productivity
in small, family-operated stores set aside, the calculation accepts that any
diﬀerences between Japan and the United States in allocation of labor
across store types and between the retail and wholesale sectors are wholly
the result of distortions and could be eliminated by an act of government
policy. If this were true, then large stores of Japan ought to be immensely
proﬁtable. They are not. The bankruptcies of the Sogo department store
chain and MyCal supermarket chain are reminders of this fact.
5.6.2 Vehicle Inspections
Although the following analysis suggests that the distorting eﬀects of the
Large Store Law may have been less than is often supposed, it also indi-
cates that regulations not speciﬁcally focused on that sector may have a dis-
torting eﬀect. Regulations that unnecessarily or wastefully increase the
cost of owning and operating a private car indirectly favor small stores over
large ones by enhancing household willingness to pay for proximity to
stores.
Japan does indeed have such a regulation, the requirement that private
car owners submit their vehicles to comprehensive inspections every two
years beginning with the car’s third year on the road. These vehicle inspec-
tions (shaken, in Japanese) are made unnecessarily expensive by the limited
number of shops licensed to conduct them and by the onerous requirement
that numerous working parts be replaced if an older car is to pass (Beck
1993). This is widely cited as the reason why the average vehicle age in
Japan is 5.8 years compared to 8.3 years in the United States, and the av-
erage annual mileage per car in Japan is only about half that of the United
States (Japan External Trade Organization [JETRO] 2002).
As recently as 1990, Japan had a mere 291 cars per thousand persons. As
a ﬁrst pass at assessing whether increasing car ownership may have run its
course, consider a simple regression of cars per thousand persons on GNP
per person in purchasing power units using 1998 data. The predicted value
for Japan is 450.1, while the actual number is 395.1. The 12 percent diﬀer-
ence is not statistically signiﬁcant.5
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5. The log linear OLS regression is ln (cars per thousand)   –2.9   0.9 ln (GNP in PPP
units) – 0.13 (dummy equal to one for Japan), where t-stat   6.6; t-stat   0.5; number of ob-
servations   26; and R2   0.65.My guess is that a further dramatic increase in car ownership in Japan is
unlikely, but a lagged response of retail structure to the past increase in car
ownership may still play out over the coming decade and beyond.
5.7 Retail Formats
Japanese statistics deﬁne eight store formats (table 5.8). Format is deter-
mined by whether or not a store is self-service and by the mix of mer-
chandise it oﬀers in three broad categories (clothing, food, and living
[ jun-kanren]). Large stores are primarily department stores, general mer-
chandise superstores, and specialty superstores. Similarly, these formats
tend to be large stores. The essential diﬀerence between general merchan-
dise superstores and department stores is that the former are self-service
stores while the latter are not.
Table 5.9provides time series on the numbers and average scale of stores
in each format. Note the 1997 changes in the deﬁnitions of specialty su-
perstores and convenience stores. Before 1997, the specialty superstore
category included stores larger than 500 square meters, which meant they
were all subject to the Large Store Law. Then, stores as small as 250 square
meters were reclassiﬁed from other superstores to specialty superstores
if their product-mix concentration met the specialty requirement. This
tripled stores in the category. Department stores and general merchandise
superstores have decreased in number from 1997 to 1999, their travails
documented in numerous news accounts.
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Table 5.8 Store Formats in Japan
Category Product Mix,a Other Requirements
Self-Serviceb
General Merchandise superstores At least 10%, but no more than 70%, of sales in each category
Specialty superstores At least 70% of sales in a categoryc
Convenience stores Includes food. Open at least 14 hours per dayd
Other superstores Self-service stores not in the other three categories
Non-Self-Service
Department stores At least 10%, but no more than 70%, of sales in each category
Specialty stores At least 90% of sales in one category
Semispecialty stores Between 50% and 90% of sales in one category
Other non-self-service stores Non-self-service stores not in the other three categories
Note: as established by the Census of Commerce of Japan for 1997 and later years.
aWithin three categories: clothing, food, and living (jun-kanren).
bA store is self-service if at least half the ﬂoor space is devoted to sale of merchandise in prepackaged or
ﬁnal form, at a price marked on the product, to customers who move freely about the store with a cart
or handbasket, and who pay no fee to enter the store.
cSize is greater than 250 square meters. Before 1997, threshold was 500 square meters.
dSize range is 30–250 square meters. Before 1997, range was 50–250 square meters.Table 5.9 Characteristics of Stores in Japan, 1985–1999
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 1999
All Retail Stores
Number 1,628,644 1,619,752 1,591,223 1,499,948 1,419,696 1,406,884
Employeesa 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.9 5.2 5.7
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. 79 93 105 111
Salesb 62 71 88 96 104 102
Department Stores
Number 438 433 455 463 476 394
Employeesa 431 446 456 444 392 427
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. 15,063 16,340 17,133 19,134
Salesb 17,762 20,930 25,086 22,981 22,416 24,633
General Merchandise Superstores
Number 1,389 1,478 1,549 1,804 1,888 1,670
Employeesa 138 136 142 151 160 192
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. 5,659 6,316 7,166 8,020
Salesb 4,258 4,491 5,268 5,175 5,274 5,299
Specialty Superstores
Number 5,873 6,397 7,130 9,354 11,656 14,455
Numberc n.a. n.a. *20,827 *25,171 *32,209 *35,531
Clothing 520 571 618 849 *4,549 *4,780
Food 4,707 4,877 5,185 6,231 *17,623 *18,707
Living 646 949 1,327 2,274 *10,037 *12,044
Employeesa 37 38 37 39 *24 *29
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,207 *731 *840
Salesb 983 1,000 1,122 1,115 *635 *668
Convenience Stores
Number 29,236 34,550 41,847 48,405 33,167 37,025
Numberc n.a. n.a. *23,837 *28,226 *36,631 *39,628
Employeesa 798 1 0 *11 *14
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. *94 *98 *99 *103
Salesb 116 145 167 172 *143 *155
Other Superstores
Number 59,643 53,834 67,473 80,036 103,273 67,476
Numberc n.a. n.a. *72,027 *84,878 *120,721 *86,367
Employeesa 6766 * 4 * 6
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. n.a. 128 *89 *110
Salesb 124 144 143 132 *83 *98
Specialty Stores
Number 1,004,883 1,007,756 1,000,166 930,143 839,969 920,277
Clothing 149,246 151,370 154,656 147,478 126,383 134,329
Food 290,789 293,203 283,570 263,681 230,163 249,287
Living 564,848 563,183 561,940 518,984 483,423 536,661
Employeesa 3444 4 5
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. 53 61 63 63
Salesb 47 51 65 66 71 68
(continued)There is no category for small family-owned stores as such: Most are ei-
ther specialty or semi-specialty stores. Two-thirds of them are sole propri-
etorships. Only 5 percent of specialty superstores and no large stores are
sole proprietorships.
Between 5 percent and 10 percent of specialty and semispecialty stores
are contained within the premises of large stores (i.e., boutiques within
larger stores). The total number of such stores (not themselves large, but
contained within the premises of ones that are large) has remained around
100,000 since 1991.
Table 5.10 shows the time series for composition of total sales across the
types of store. These data reﬂect the same trends in numbers of stores.
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Table 5.9 (continued)
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 1999
Semispecialty Stores
Number 524,885 513,338 470,289 429,108 385,748 319,685
Clothing 74,232 78,608 76,903 65,733 62,882 54,928
Food 271,593 253,352 224,756 185,509 154,736 131,465
Living 177,644 179,715 166,740 175,857 168,130 133,292
Employeesa 3344 4 4
Area (m2) n.a. n.a. 62 69 74 76
Salesb 47 54 67 76 82 75
Source: MITI (various years).
Note: Asterisks indicate data based on 1997 deﬁnitions rather than earlier ones. n.a.   not
available.
aAverage number per store.
bAverage annual sales in ¥ millions.
cUsing 1997 deﬁnitions, for which see text.
Table 5.10 Composition of Total Sales Across Formats of Stores, 1985–1999 (%)
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997a 1999a
Department store 7.6 7.9 8.1 7.4 7.2 6.7
General merchandise superstore 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.5 6.7 6.2
Specialty superstore 5.7 5.6 5.7 7.3 13.8 16.5
Convenience 3.3 4.4 5.0 5.8 3.5 4.3
Other superstore 7.3 6.8 6.9 7.4 6.8 5.9
Specialty 46.0 45.2 45.9 42.6 40.4 43.5
Semispecialty 24.0 24.2 22.4 22.9 21.3 16.7
Other 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3
Source: MITI (various years).
aChanges in deﬁnitions of specialty superstores, convenience stores, and other superstores in
1997 increases specialty superstores relative to the other two formats and makes the series for
the three formats discontinuous. Data using the new deﬁnitions are in italics.5.7.1 Inﬂuences on the Number of Stores by Format
The Large Store Law has limited the number of stores with large ﬂoor
space. Almost all of these are department stores, general merchandise su-
perstores, or specialty superstores. The law also ought to have induced in-
creased numbers of stores of other formats. These include small family-
owned, non-self-service stores that are mostly classiﬁed as specialty stores
or semispecialty stores. Our next task is to measure these eﬀects.
In measuring the eﬀect of regulatory change on the number of stores, it
is necessary to control for changes in other factors inﬂuencing retail den-
sity. These include increasing ownership of passenger cars, increasing av-
erage space per person in dwellings, and declining population density in
cities as the suburbs expand. Increasing car ownership favors evolution to-
wards a retail sector with fewer, larger stores. Declining population density
per se has the opposite eﬀect on retail density, but is probably itself an in-
evitable accompaniment of the move toward car ownership and larger
dwellings. All three trends can be placed under the heading “suburbaniza-
tion.” Tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 document them.
More living space means that storage space is less constrained, enabling
households to shop less frequently for daily necessities and to maintain
larger stocks, eroding the value to households of proximity to stores selling
nondurables. The eﬀect of larger, less crowded dwellings on the numbers of
stores selling durables is possibly the opposite, leading to more such stores.
But stores selling nondurables, such as food and daily necessities, are more
numerous than the ones selling durables, such as furniture.
As population density becomes less, the marginal beneﬁt to households
of a proliferation of stores becomes greater. This eﬀect arises because, as
households are more diﬀuse, any given number of stores per household en-
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Table 5.11 Spread of Car Ownership, 1965–1998









Source: Government of Japan (various years).
Note: n.a.   not applicable.
aPassenger cars.
bAverage annual percentage change from previous entry.tails a greater average distance from each household to the nearest store,
and the reduction in that distance with each given increase in number of
stores becomes correspondingly greater. (See Flath [1990] for an algebraic
treatment of this phenomenon.) The point here is that the gradual decline
in average population density that has accompanied the proliferation of
cars and increased spaciousness of dwellings has possibly in and of itself
slowed the push towards fewer, larger stores in Japan.
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Table 5.12 Changes in Japanese Dwellings, 1965–1998
Persons Per Area (m2) Per
Rooms Per Change in Area
Dwelling Dwelling Room Dwelling Person Per Persona
1963 3.82 4.43 1.16 72.52 16.36 n.a.
1968 3.84 3.96 1.03 73.86 18.63 2.6
1973 4.15 3.63 0.87 77.14 21.26 2.7
1978 4.52 3.47 0.77 80.28 23.17 1.7
1983 4.73 3.35 0.71 85.92 25.69 2.1
1988 4.86 3.21 0.66 89.29 27.86 1.6
1993 4.85 3.02 0.62 91.92 30.46 1.8
1998 4.79 2.83 0.59 92.43 32.70 1.4
Source: Government of Japan (various years).
Note: n.a.   not applicable.
aAverage annual percentage change between years shown.
Table 5.13 Measures of Population Density, 1965–1995
District Densitya Overall Density
Populationb Areac Averaged Changee
1965 48.1 1.23 10,263 n.a.
1970 53.5 1.71 8,678 –3.3
1975 57.0 2.19 7,712 –2.3
1980 59.7 2.65 6,983 –2.0
1985 60.6 2.80 6,938 –0.1
1990 63.2 3.11 6,661 –0.8
1995 64.7 3.24 6,630 –0.1
Source: Government of Japan (various years).
Note: n.a.   not applicable.
aDensely inhabited districts are contiguous census districts with high population density (in
principle, 4,000 inhabitants or more per square kilometer) within the boundary of a city,
ward, town, or village constituting an agglomeration of 5,000 or more inhabitants.
bPopulation of densely inhabited districts as a percentage of Japan’s total population.
cDensely inhabited districts as a percentage of Japan’s total area.
dOverall population density per square kilometer.
eAnnual average percentage change in density since previous census.5.8 Results from Analyzing Prefectural Diﬀerences
Regulatory eﬀects should vary among prefectures because, although a
national statute, the Large Store Law was implemented through locally
administered advisory panels in each municipal jurisdiction. To measure
these regulatory eﬀects, I ran a set of regressions (detailed in box 5.1); the
results are in table 5.14.
An examination of the ﬁrst column estimates in table 5.14 reveals that
car ownership and urban population density have inﬂuenced the overall
density of stores in the expected way. Disappointingly, size of dwelling has
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Box 5.1 Prefectural Regressions
To explain the numbers of stores of diﬀerent kinds per person,
I ran OLS regressions using data for each of Japan’s 47 prefec-
tures from ﬁve consecutive Censuses of Commerce of Japan
(1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1997; MITI, various years). The
dependent variable is the natural log of the number of stores per
1000 persons. There is a diﬀerent equation for each diﬀerent for-
mat of store and for all stores.
The independent variables are the same in each equation and,
as in Matsui and Nariu (2001), include a dummy variable for each
prefectures. I do not report the estimates of coeﬃcients on these
dummies.
The independent variables of interest include the natural logs
of the three variables being discussed, observed for each prefec-
ture: passenger cars per 1,000 persons, dwelling ﬂoor space per
person, and 1,000 persons per square kilometer in densely inhab-
ited districts. To further control for the diﬀusion of population, I
included the fraction of each prefecture’s population residing in
densely inhabited districts. It was necessary to log linearly inter-
polate between, or extrapolate from, housing census years and
population census years respectively. Annual data are available
for passenger car registrations.
The natural logarithms of the number of class 1 large stores
and of class 2 large stores are included to measure the severity of
regulation of large stores. So, for example, after 1994, large stores
with ﬂoor space between 500 square meters and 1,000 square
meters were automatically approved by MITI, but in the Census




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.not exerted a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on overall density of stores (nor
a coherent eﬀect on numbers of stores of particular formats).
The number of class 1 large stores (ﬂoor space of 3,000 square meters or
more, except in the central parts of major cities where it is 6,000 square me-
ters or more, and a proxy for regulation) has no measurable eﬀect on the
overall number of stores. However, the density of class 2 large stores (those
that are not class 1, and another proxy for regulation) is inversely related to
the overall number of stores, as expected. Possibly this reﬂects the much
greater temporal variation in the number of class 2 stores than in class 1
stores (shown in table 5.5).
All of the variables, including the number of class 2 stores, have inelastic
eﬀects on the overall number of stores. Over the period 1985–1997, the
number of class 2 stores grew about 5 percent per year, while the overall
number of stores shrank about 1.1 percent. Given the estimated elasticity
of overall number of stores with respect to number of class 2 stores of –
0.10, expansion of these large stores by itself accounts for a little less than
half of the constriction in overall number of stores.
Relaxed regulation is a contributing factor to reduction in number of
stores, slightly less important than increasing car ownership. The inelas-
ticity of overall number of stores with respect to number of class 2 large
stores of –0.10 generally argues against regulatory limits on large stores as
being in any way crucial in explaining the proliferation of small stores.
Fore xample, quadrupling or quintupling the number of class 1 and class 2
stores would roughly match the density of such stores per person in the
United States, but based on these estimates would still not dramatically re-
duce the overall number of stores in Japan.
If regulation mattered greatly, one would expect that in prefectures
where the large store law was more loosely applied, overall retail density
would be dramatically smaller than elsewhere. This does not appear to
have been the case. Fundamentals, including those embedded in the pre-
fecture by ﬁxed eﬀects, account for far more of the variation in overall store
density both across prefectures and over time than does the regulatory-
determined number of large stores.
The inﬂuences of the regulation variables and car ownership on density
of stores of each format instill more conﬁdence in the economic model
underlying the speciﬁcation and the interpretation of results just oﬀered.
The positive inﬂuence of the regulation-determined number of class 1 large
stores on the number of department stores is evident, as is the positive in-
ﬂuence of the number of class 2 large stores on the number of general mer-
chandise superstores and specialty superstores. This comports with the
fact that most of the department stores have very great ﬂoor space and thus
are in class 1.
Car ownership generally undercuts specialty stores and semispecialty
stores and promotes convenience stores, department stores, and self-
Regulation, Distribution Eﬃciency, and Retail Density 151service stores (i.e., superstores) of all kinds. The very large, positive inﬂu-
ence of increasing car ownership on the number of convenience stores may
be an important reason for their recent very rapid growth.
The size of the eﬀect of car ownership on overall number of stores shown
in table 5.11 (elasticity   –0.17) is quite a bit less than in the cross-country
regression of table 5.4 (elasticity   –0.3). (The larger coeﬃcient estimate 
[–0.6] from table 5.4 is perhaps biased by exclusion of the variable CR-
WDNG pertaining to size of dwelling.) There is a simple explanation for
this: The regulatory limit on the number of large stores in Japan is damp-
ening the response of number of stores to increasing car ownership.
If this is true, then it suggests a way of quantifying the likely ultimate
eﬀect of deregulation on the overall number of stores: It might be roughly
equivalent to the eﬀect of doubling the responsiveness of overall numbers
of stores to increased car ownership from an elasticity of 0.17 to 0.30. That
is, one might expect the overall number of stores in Japan ultimately to fall
by about 15 percent from its 1997 level (11.3 per thousand persons) to
around 9.6 per thousand.
The picture that emerges is one that matches the earlier analysis of in-
ternational data: Regulatory distortions account for little in explaining
Japan’s high density of stores.
5.9 Conclusion
The Japanese distribution sector certainly exhibits peculiarities. It has
vastly more stores per person than most other rich countries. It also has
particularly complex wholesale marketing channels with multiple steps
and ubiquitous vertical restraints. This chapter has explored the reasons
and found them to relate more to economics than to regulation. It also has
shown how the peculiarities are complementary.
Scarcity of living space and the inconvenience of owning and operating
a car has enhanced Japanese households’ willingness to pay for nearby
shopping. Japan’s geographic centricity has facilitated development of a
transport system and complex logistical arteries that lower the costs of
continually restocking the many retail outlets. These factors combine to
make a proliferation of stores in Japan not only inevitable, but also eﬃ-
cient. Given this, regulations protecting small stores from competition by
large ones (mostly in the form of the Large Store Law and its successor, the
Large Store Location Law) imply only minor economic distortions and en-
counter little eﬀective political resistance. But as car ownership has grown,
the distorting eﬀects of regulations limiting large stores have become
greater and politically less tenable.
A proliferation of small stores increases the economic advantages of
logistical arteries with many branches, which in turn lowers the costs of
am ultiplicity of wholesale steps. The implied ubiquity of retailers and
152 David Flathwholesalers increases the horizontal externalities that arise in promoting
and marketing goods and that are the target of vertical restraints, such as
customer assignments and exclusive dealing stipulations. The distortions
that are an unwanted consequence of these sorts of stipulations lead to fur-
ther manufacturer- and wholesaler-initiated stipulations on pricing and
shipment quantities, which are tolerated by lax enforcement of antimo-
nopoly laws.
Some of the fundamental forces accounting for Japan’s proliferation of
small stores are changing. For example, car ownership increased dramati-
cally during the 1990s, and the average size of dwelling also is steadily in-
creasing. Probably as a result, in the 1990s, grocery supermarkets and gen-
eral merchandise superstores increased in number in Japan even as the
overall number of stores steadily declined. Changes in implementation of
the Large Store Law introduced in 1994 and its ultimate repeal and re-
placement with the Large Scale Retail Store Location Law in 2000 also have
contributed to changes in the number and composition of Japan’s stores.
Government policies shape the economy, but the reverse also is true.
Regulations emerge from a political process in which economic forces op-
erate (Becker 1983). In Japan, as elsewhere, the economy has shaped regu-
lations, and regulation has reinforced inherent tendencies rather than fun-
damentally altered them.
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